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PARTIES TO THIS APPEAL
The plaintiffs and appellants are B.R. and C.R., the minor children of Kristy
Ragsdale, deceased, and of David Ragsdale, who murdered Kristy in January 2008.
William M. Jeffs identifies himself as Plaintiffs' conservator, prosecuting this appeal and
the underlying lawsuit on their behalf. In this appeal, defendants-appellees assume,
without conceding, that Mr. Jeffs has authority to prosecute this case for Plaintiffs.
Defendants and appellees are Trina West, A.F.N.P., Hugo Rodier, M.D., and Pioneer
Comprehensive Medical Clinic. Plaintiffs allege the existence often "John Doe"
defendants.
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

B.R., a minor child, and C.R., a minor child, by
and through their conservator, WILLIAM M.
JEFFS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

CaseNo.20110207-SC

vs.
TRINA WEST. A.F.N.P., HUGO RODIER,
M.D., PIONEER COMPREHENSIVE
MEDICAL CLINIC, and Does 1-X,
Defendants-Appellees.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
•k -k -k

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is Plaintiffs' appeal from a judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt
Lake County, the Honorable Denise Lindberg, dismissing their amended complaint for
health care malpractice. The appeal was originally filed in this Court, which
provisionally transferred the case to the Utah Court of Appeals. At Plaintiffs' request, this
Court retained jurisdiction, which exists originally under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)
(West 2011).

1

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL,
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW,
and
ISSUE PRESERVATION
I. Did the trial court correctly dismiss Plaintiffs' amended complaint, because
no patient-health care provider relationship existed between Plaintiffs and the
Defendant health care providers, and because there is no other justification to find a
duty of care owed by Defendants to the non-patient Plaintiffs? This argument was
raised in Defendants' motion to dismiss (R. 47-52, 302-308), and was the basis for the
trial court's order of dismissal. (R. 391-392).
The order of dismissal was entered under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), failure to state
a claim for which relief may be granted. This Court's review will be de novo, affording
no deference to the trial court. E.g., Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2010
UT 29 If 10, 232 P.3d 999, 1004. Whether a duty exists, between a particular defendant
and plaintiff, is "purely a legal issue for the court to decide," and therefore, no deference
is owed to the trial court. E.g., Normandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc., 2009 UT 44 f
17-18, 215 P.3d 152, 157-158.
II. Does Patient David Ragsdale's conviction for aggravated murder, based
upon his guilty plea to intentionally and knowingly killing Kristy Ragsdale, now bar
Plaintiffs, the Ragsdale children, from attempting to prove that Patient killed Kristy
due to his prescribed medications? This argument was raised in defendants' alternative
motion for summary judgment (R. 52-59, 308-312); the trial court rejected it (R. 392,
copied in Br. of Appellants Appx. p. 13). Review of a summary judgment decision, under
2

Utah R. Civ. P. 56, is non-deferential. E.g., Cabaness v. Thomas, 2010 UT 23 f 18, 232
P.3d486,495.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, AND RULES
The trial court's decision was made under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted), and under Utah R. Civ. P. 56 (summary
judgment). Each provision is copied in Appendix 1 of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, and Proceedings in the Trial Court
In this case, Plaintiffs seek to hold the Defendant health care providers liable for a
knowing and intentional murder that was committed by one of their patients. Plaintiffs
are the minor children of Kristy Ragsdale, who was murdered in January 2008 by her
estranged husband, David Ragsdale.
Prior to the murder, David Ragsdale ("Patient") had been receiving health care
from Defendant Trina West, A.F.N.P., an advanced family nurse practitioner ("Nurse
West"). Codefendant Dr. Rodier was Nurse West's consulting physician; he and Nurse
West both worked for codefendant Pioneer Clinic. (Amended Complaint, R. 19-29,
copied in Appx. 2 of this brief.) Patient was criminally charged for killing his estranged
wife, and eventually pled guilty to aggravated murder. In January 2009, he was
sentenced to a term of twenty years to life at the Utah State Prison, which he is currently
serving. (Judgment and Sentence, State v. David Ragsdale, R. 93-95.)

3

Plaintiffs were toddlers at the time of the murder. In November 2009, they
(through their conservator) served notice of their intent to sue the Defendant health care
providers, followed, in April 2010, by service of their amended complaint. Patient, the
murderer, is not a plaintiff, nor did Plaintiffs name him as a codefendant. However,
Plaintiffs' malpractice claims were wholly based upon Defendants' care of Patient, or
failure to care for him. Plaintiffs alleged that Nurse West had improperly prescribed
various medications for Patient. Those medications, Plaintiffs alleged, had "toxic side
effects" that had caused Patient to kill his estranged wife, Kristy. Against codefendants
Dr. Rodier and Pioneer Clinic, Plaintiffs alleged failure to adequately monitor Nurse
West's care of Patient. (See Amended Complaint, R. 19-29, in Appx. 2.)
Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint on two alternative grounds.
First, Defendants argued that they owed no duty of care toward Plaintiffs, who were not
Defendants' patients, and therefore, Plaintiffs cannot sue Defendants for malpractice. (R.
47-52, 302-308.) Second, relying upon the record of the criminal prosecution,
Defendants argued that Patient's guilty plea to aggravated murder—i.e., to knowingly and
intentionally killing his wife—bars Plaintiffs' claim that Patient killed her due to the
influence of his medications. (R. 52-59, 308-312.)
The trial court granted Defendants' motion on the first asserted ground. The court
held that it was "not persuaded that, under the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint,
the non-patient plaintiffs may step into [Patient]'s shoes to pursue a malpractice lawsuit
against the defendants." (Ruling and Order, R. 391-392, copied in Appx. 3.) The court

4

rejected Defendants' second argument, holding that because Plaintiffs had not been
parties to the criminal case, nor in privity with those parties, the "issue preclusion" bar
does not apply. (Id.)
Plaintiffs now appeal. Asking this Court to affirm, Defendants reassert both of
their original grounds for dismissal.
Statement of Facts
The parties' arguments on appeal, as in the trial court, are based upon the
allegations in Plaintiffs' amended complaint, and also upon the record of Patient's
criminal prosecution.1 This fact recitation is taken from both of those sources.
1.

From mid-April 2007 through December 21, 2007, Patient received health

care from Defendant Nurse West at codefendant Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic,
where she and codefendant Dr. Rodier both worked. (Amended Complaint 112-28, R.
21-22, in Appx. 2.)
2.

Plaintiffs do not allege that they were patients of Defendants. Patient is not

a party to this lawsuit. (Amended Complaint, R. 19-29, in Appx. 2.)
3.

Plaintiffs do not allege that at any time, Patient was under the custody or

control of the Defendant health care providers. (Id.)

defendants submitted copies of the criminal prosecution record to the trial court,
asking the court to take judicial notice of it. (R. 41, 52-53.) Plaintiffs did not object.
5

4.

It is presumed true that as of December 21, 2007, Nurse West was

prescribing seven medications for Patient, including psychotropic medications and
steroids. (Id. Tf 30.)
5.

Plaintiffs do not allege that codefendant Dr. Rodier, nor any other Pioneer

Clinic staff member, had any active involvement in Nurse West's prescribing decisions.
They only allege that Dr. Rodier failed to provide certain consultation and monitoring of
Patient's treatment by Nurse West. (Id. f 44.)
6.

It is presumed true that Nurse West learned, no later than December 21,

2007, that Patient was having marital problems, and that his wife, Kristy, had obtained a
"restraining order" against him. (Id. 128.)
7.

Plaintiffs allege that as of December 21, 2007, Patient "was displaying toxic

side effects from the combination of his prescribed medications." (Id. Tf 29.)
8.

On Sunday, January 6, 2008, Patient shot his estranged wife, Kristy

Ragsdale, multiple times in a church parking lot, in front of several witnesses. She died
at the scene. (Id. If 31.)
9.

Within two hours of the shooting, Patient turned himself in to police. (Id. f

32.) At that time, he did not discuss the case, but invoked his "Miranda" rights and
retained counsel. (Tr. criminal sentencing, R. 157-159, in Appx. 6.)
10.

It is presumed true that a blood sample, apparently taken from Patient after

his arrest, showed that his medications were within prescribed ranges, with no illicit
substances detected. (Amended Complaint f 33.)
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11.

By criminal information dated January 28, 2008, Patient was charged with

aggravated murder, death penalty-eligible, and with two counts of domestic violence in
the presence of a child.2 (Criminal docket, R. 63, State v. Ragsdale, Utah Fourth Judicial
District No. 081400235, copied in Appx.4; criminal information, R. 80-81.)
12.

Patient was initially represented by criminal defense attorney Gregory

Skordas. (Criminal docket entries 1/28/08 through 7/9/08, R. 65-73, in Appx. 4.)
13.

On one occasion, attorney Skordas obtained a continuation of the criminal

prosecution, to complete a doctor's evaluation of Patient. (Tr. of 3/5/08 criminal hearing,
R. 123.)
14.

Patient's criminal preliminary hearing was held on June 2, 2008, before

Fourth District Judge Laycock, who ordered him bound over for trial. (Criminal docket
sheet, R. 69-72, in Appx. 4.)
15.

Several weeks later, attorney Skordas withdrew as Patient's counsel;

attorneys from the Utah County Public Defender Association then entered their
appearance as Patient's counsel. (Id., R. 72-73.)
16.

On November 26, 2008, Patient appeared in court, again before Judge

Laycock. At that time, he pleaded guilty to aggravated murder, Count I of the criminal
information, a first degree felony. Counts II and III were dismissed. (Tr. of change-ofplea hearing, R. 127-153, copied in Appx. 5.)

2

The children involved were not Plaintiffs; they were children of another family
going to the same church when Kristy was murdered. (Tr. plea hearing, R. 151, Appx. 5.)
7

17.

Before the court accepted Patient's guilty plea, his attorney, Mr. Kawai,

described the efforts made by the defense. "We retained a mitigation expert who's been
doing mitigation research into the Ragsdale matter. Also a psychologist and a factual
expert...." (Id., R. 130.)
18.

Attorney Kawai added that the guilty plea was the product of negotiations

that included the involvement of Kristy Ragsdale's parents, Mr. and Mrs. Palizzi. (Id., R.
130, 132.) The prosecutor confirmed that via Mrs. Palizzi, Kristy's family had discussed
and approved the proposed plea. (Id., R. 133-134.)
19.

The guilty plea was supported by a written "Statement of Defendant in

Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel." That "plea statement," signed by
Patient, recited the elements of aggravated murder as follows:
On or about January 6, 2008;
in Utah County;
I intentionally or knowingly;
caused the death of another;
under circumstances creating a great risk of death to a person other than the
victim and the actor.
(Plea statement, R. 84, emphasis added.)
20.

The plea statement included Patient's affirmation that he was entering the

guilty plea voluntarily, with the assistance of counsel, with awareness of the rights that he
was thereby waiving, and with awareness of the consequences of his guilty plea. (Id., R.
84-88.)
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21.

The plea statement included affirmations, from defense counsel and from

the prosecutor, to the effect that the representations made therein, by Patient, were
accurate. (Id., R. 89-90.)
22.

Judge Laycock conducted a "plea colloquy" with Patient, his counsel, and

the prosecutor, including inquiries into the factual bases for the plea, the rights he was
waiving by pleading guilty, and the punishment for the murder. (Tr. change-of-plea
hearing, R. 132-149, 151-152, in Appx. 5.)
23.

Following the above-summarized colloquy, Judge Laycock entered an

Order accepting Patient's guilty plea, finding that the plea was "freely, knowingly, and
voluntarily made." (Plea statement, R. 91.)
24.

Patient's sentencing hearing, in January 2009, was held before Judge

Laycock. Patient's attorney, Mr. Kawai, commented as follows on the question whether
Patient's medications had played a part in the murder:
Your honor, there has been talk of the medication that he was on. We
had Dr. Pablo Stewart do evaluations of that medication, and it is his
medical opinion that the high dosages of the multiple medications that
he was on that day greatly contributed to that. That's not a legal
defense; there were no legal defenses that we could make because of
that information. It's not an excuse for his actions. Many people are on
high dosages of medication and they don't do the horrible acts that
David did. But I look at what happened on the 6th of January, 2008 and
it just seems like there was a storm brewing, that storm was exacerbated
by the medications that David was on, and it's just a tragedy as to what
happened.
(Tr. sentencing hearing, R. 175-176, copied in Appx. 6.)
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25.

In his comments at sentencing, Patient claimed that he would not have

murdered Kristy but for his medications, yet acknowledged that he was accepting "full
responsibility" for the murder. (Id., R. 177.)
26.

At the sentencing hearing, Kristy Ragsdale's parents, Mr. and Mrs. Palizzi,

appeared. Mrs. Palizzi (who had been an eyewitness to the murder) spoke for the
Ragsdale children, who are now Plaintiffs in this civil lawsuit. From her comments, and
those of Judge Laycock, it is apparent that Mr. and Mrs. Palizzi have assumed parental
responsibility for Plaintiffs. Mrs. Palizzi expressed no criticism of the handling of the
criminal prosecution, attributed Patient's crime to "selfishness," and expressed gratitude
toward the court, the prosecutors, and the community. (Id., R. 178-187, 200-201, in
Appx. 6.)
27.

Before pronouncing sentence, Judge Laycock made the following

observations:
This was literally one moment of incalculable cruelty and selfishness on
Mr. Ragsdale's part.
I understand the claims about the various psychotropic drugs that
[Patient] was prescribed and using, but as I view the evidence from the
preliminary hearing, and what I've heard today that gave me added
detail that I didn't even get at that hearing, it's very clear to me that
regardless of whatever prescription drugs he was taking, he knew very
well what he was doing.
The testimony was from several people that they saw him sitting in his
BMW on the south side of the church, as I recall it was the south side of
the church, and they passed him. They saw the car. It's veiy clear to
me he was there. He waited until he saw his wife drive past. From the
vantage point he would certainly have known that his mother-in-law was
in the car with her. He watched them drive past. He went into the
10

parking lot of the church. He went around until he found them. It didn't
take long. He stepped out of the car and without a word, in probably
less than a minute, emptied the gun into his wife. I am convinced he
knew exactly what he was doing.
Now, whether or not he was taking drugs, whether or not he planned this
for a day or for a half hour, he understood exactly what he was doing.
He may not have understood all the ramifications and how it would hurt
all the people that have spoken to me and the countless others who have
not spoken to me today, but he knew what he was doing.
(Id., R. 201,203-204.) The sentence was twenty years to life. (Id., R. 205.)
28.

Patient, David Ragsdale, has never moved to withdraw his guilty plea, nor

has he appealed or otherwise challenged his conviction for aggravated murder. (Criminal
docket, R. 63-78, in Appx. 4.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. This Court should affirm the trial court's judgment that, under the facts of this
case, the Defendant health care providers owed no duty of care to the non-patient
Plaintiffs. That judgment is well-supported by this Court's case law that limits health
care provider liability, to non-patients who have been injured by patients, to instances
wherein the patient is either under the "custody or control" of, or in a "special
relationship" with the care provider. Such relationships arise only when the patient
should be recognized to be "uniquely dangerous," a situation not present in this case. If
allowed to proceed, Plaintiffs' claim would inappropriately expand malpractice risks for
health care providers, and would actually chill the provision of needed health care. The
judgment of dismissal was also proper under the "generic" duty analysis urged by
Plaintiffs, accounting for the health care context of this case.
11

II. Alternatively or additionally, the judgment of dismissal may be affirmed upon
the ground rejected by the trial court—that Patient's guilty plea to intentionally killing his
estranged wife conclusively excludes Plaintiffs' proposed civil claim that he killed her
under the influence of his prescription medications. A restrictive application of issue
preclusion would seemingly prohibit this defense. However, application of the doctrine
in light of its underpinning policies, particularly judicial economy and integrity, should
bar Plaintiffs, who approved the guilty plea, from re-litigating the question whether
Patient's medication caused him, to any degree, to murder his wife.
ARGUMENT
Introduction and Issue Clarification
Plaintiffs assert that Defendants are liable for the allegedly negligent prescribing of
certain medications for Patient. Those medications, they allege, caused Patient to shoot
his estranged wife, Kristy Ragsdale. So vehemently do Plaintiffs assert this, that they
demand punitive damages (Amended Complaint, R. 28, in Appx. 2)—as if Defendants
themselves had committed the murder.
It is agreed that Patient, if he chose to do so, could prosecute that "negligent
prescribing" claim (although on the particular facts, he would be barred, as explained in
Point II). It is agreed that if Patient had died from the allegedly negligently-prescribed
medications, Plaintiffs, as his heirs, would have a claim for wrongful death under Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-3-106 (West 2011). In other words, it is agreed that Defendants, or at
least Nurse West, had a duty toward Patient.
12

But Patient is not a party to this case. Patient is alive. He is believed to be
incarcerated at the Utah State Prison, from where he has access to the Utah state courts.
It is unknown whether Patient is even aware of Plaintiffs' lawsuit.
For Plaintiffs' lawsuit to proceed, they must show that they, as non-patients, may
assert the "negligent prescribing" theory that normally could be asserted only by Patient
(or his survivors, if Patient had died from the alleged malpractice). The trial court held
that under the facts of the case, Plaintiffs cannot "step into Patient's shoes" to pursue such
a claim. In effect, the trial court held that Defendants had no duty of care toward the nonpatient Plaintiffs. As shown in the argument points that follow, the trial court's holding
was proper on a number of grounds.

Plaintiffs assert that the trial court applied a blanket "only the patient may sue"
rule. (Br. of Appellants pp. 3, 6-7, 12-13.) The court's comments do reveal its concern
that Patient is not a party to this case. (Tr. Mot. to Dismiss, R. 415 p. 32-33.) However,
in their motion papers, all parties addressed the question whether this case falls within an
exception to that general rule. (R. 48-52, 253-265, 285-291.) A good way to address this
case is to begin with a presumption that only the patient may sue the provider, and then
decide whether the case falls within a legitimate exception to such presumption. As
argued herein, this case falls within no such exception.
13

POINT I
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS WERE CORRECTLY DISMISSED
BECAUSE UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, THE HEALTH CARE
PROVIDERS HAD NO DUTY TO THE NON-PATIENT PLAINTIFFS
A
Because Patient Was Not In Defendants' Custody or Control,
Nor Otherwise in a "Special Relationship" with Defendants,
Defendants Owed No Duty Toward Plaintiffs.
1. Health Care Cases Provide Primary Guidance,
This Court has acknowledged "confusing cross-currents of tort law" on the
question of when a particular defendant may owe a duty toward a particular plaintiff.
Webb v. Univ. of Utah, 2005 UT 80 % 7, 125 P.3d 906, 908. Those currents have been
swirling since Palsgrafv. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). From
those cross-currents, Plaintiffs in this case extract various judicial statements that, isolated
from their contexts, would seemingly support Plaintiffs5 argument that the Defendant
health care providers owed a duty toward Ihem. Defendants disagree with Plaintiffs'
approach because there is prominent Utah case law that deals much more directly with the
context of this case.
That case law is related to health care—particularly, mental health care. This
Court has decided three significant cases wherein mental health patients injured nonpatients. The injured non-patients then sued the care providers for malpractice. The
cases are Wilson v. Valley Mental Health, 969 P.2d 416 (Utah 1998), Higgins v. Salt Lake
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County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993), and Rollins v. Peterson, 813 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1991).4
In all three cases, the non-patients' claims were barred, either for lack of duty {Wilson,
Rollins), or based upon governmental immunity {Higgins). All three cases contain
significant discussion about when a duty may exist to non-patients.5
Obviously, this Court's mental health cases arise from factual contexts that are
quite similar to this case. The policies articulated in these cases also apply to this case.
Accordingly, Defendants herein base their argument, for affirmance of the trial court's
judgment, primarily upon these cases. Defendants will also address Plaintiffs' more
"generic" arguments, but not until after our arguments within the health care context.
2. No "Custody or Control, " Nor Other "Special Relationship. "
In a footnote to Young v. Salt Lake City School District, 2002 UT 64, 52 P.3d
1230, this Court explained a significant element of its mental health cases— Wilson,
Higgins, and Rollins. Those cases, the Court explained, along with Beach v. University of
Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986), "clearly demonstrate that control over, or custody of, the

4

Utah has a statutory "duty to protect" law that applies to mental health therapists.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-502(l) (West 2011). Because Defendants in this case are not
"therapists," their potential "duty to protect" is broader than Utah's statutory duty, and is
governed by this Court's case law. Wilson, 969 P.2d at 420, 421.
5
Plaintiffs state that in Higgins, "this Court permitted a claim against [care
providers] by the victim of an attack by a mental patient." (Br. of Appellants p. 11). This
Court did not permit that claim to proceed, ultimately holding that it was barred by
governmental immunity. Higgins, 855 P.2d at 240-241. Plaintiffs also assert that in
Higgins, "the fact that the victim was not the defendant's patient was not even an issue."
(Br. of Appellants p. 11.) That fact was a central issue in that portion of Higgins wherein
this Court stated, in what effectively was dictum, that a duty could exist, based on certain
alleged facts, between defendants and the non-patient victim, 855 P.2d at 234-240.
15

primary person who caused the injury is a necessary prerequisite before engaging in a
foreseeability of harm analysis." Young, 2002 UT 64117 n.7, 52 P.3d at 1234 n.7
(emphasis added). Subsequently, in Doe v. Corporation of the President of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2004 UT App 274, 98 P.3d 429, the Utah Court of
Appeals held that the LDS Church had no duty to protect children, in an LDS stake, from
alleged sexual abuse by an LDS High Priest. No duty existed because neither the High
Priest nor the children were in the Church's "custody or control" at the time of the alleged
abuse. 2004 UT App 274ffif11-14, 98 P.3d at 431-433.
In this case, Plaintiffs neither allege nor suggest that Patient was ever in
Defendants' "custody or control." He was not in court-ordered treatment; nor was he
otherwise under Defendants' physical or legal control. Compare Young, 2002 UT 64 f
14, 52 P.3d at 1233 (student may be in elementary school's "custody or control" during
normal school hours). He was a voluntary, adult patient, receiving care at an outpatient
clinic. Therefore, read at face value, Young and Doe justify the dismissal of Plaintiffs'
claims.
Granted, Young and Doe did not arise in a health care context. The patient in
Higgins, a health care case, had not been in the care providers' custody or control when
she stabbed the non-patient plaintiff. In Higgins, this Court stated that "legal ability to
control" the patient is "only one factor to consider" in deciding whether a duty could exist
to a non-patient. 855 P.2d at 237 n.5. The ultimate inquiry is whether the care providerpatient relationship is so "special" that it creates a duty toward one or more non-patients.
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Id. In fact, this Court's analysis in Young, along with the court of appeals' analysis in
Doe, were founded not solely upon "custody or control," but also upon the closely related
question whether a "special relationship" existed. Young, 2002 UT 64 f 14, 52 P.3d at
1233; Doe, 2004 UT App 110-12, 98 P.3d at 431-432.
In this case, no such "special relationship" is apparent. Besides no inkling of
"custody or control," there is nothing else in the relationship between Patient and
Defendants that is sufficiently "special" to impose a duty, upon Defendants, toward
Plaintiffs. This Court has rejected the argument that such "special relationship" arises in
every care provider-patient relationship. Higgins, 855 P.2d at 238. Instead, the primary
"special relationship" consideration, in this context, is whether the patient "has shown
him- or herself to be uniquely dangerous" to others. Id. at 237. This means that the
patient is "likely" to cause bodily harm to a non-patient. Id. at 238. "[T]he term is
'likely' to cause, not 'might' cause." Id., citing Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1162.
Plaintiffs in this case allege nothing to show that Patient was "uniquely
dangerous," and "likely" to physically harm others, while under Defendants' care. They
vaguely allege that on December 21, 2007, over two weeks before the murder, Patient
was experiencing unspecified "toxic side effects" from his medications. (Amended
Complaint, R. 22.)6 Virtually every medication, including common nonprescription
medications, can have "toxic side effects." These could mean anything from a skin rash,

defendants dispute that allegation, but acknowledge that it, like other factual
allegations in this case, may be presumed true for purposes of a motion to dismiss.
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to constipation, to sudden cardiac arrest. The term is useless in helping to decide whether
Patient was "uniquely dangerous."
Plaintiffs also allege that on that same date, two weeks before the murder, Patient
acknowledged marital problems to Nurse West, and reported that a "restraining order had
been entered against him" by his estranged wife. (Id.) Such allegations also would not
support a duty toward Plaintiffs, nor toward the wife. "Marital problems," which are
common, surely do not make a patient "uniquely dangerous" to anybody. And a
"restraining order" would not change Defendants' duty. This Court is "loath to recognize
a duty that is realistically incapable of performance or fundamentally at odds with the
nature of the parties' relationship." Higgins, 855 P.2d at 237. The restraining order did
not convert the Defendant care providers into law enforcement officers.
Furthermore, existence of a restraining order was not a "symptom." This Court
has stated that a health care provider is not required to "take measures not otherwise
indicated by the apparent symptoms of the patient" Higgins, 855 P.2d at 240 n.7
(emphasis added). Plaintiffs make no allegation that Patient showed symptoms, or made
any statements, to show that he was likely to violate the restraining order. Thus existence
of the restraining order also does not show that Patient had become "likely" to injure
someone, or had otherwise become "uniquely dangerous." It was equally or more likely
that the restraining order would serve its intended function of keeping Patient away from
his estranged wife. In any event, the restraining order was a law enforcement issue, not a
clinical symptom that Patient was likely to attack his wife.
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Plaintiffs argue that because Patient's estranged wife was an individuallyidentifiable non-patient potential victim, Defendants had a duty toward her. They draw
that argument from various cases where that distinction has been made, in deciding
whether a duty is owed. However, under Rollins and Higgins, even if an individual
potential victim is known, the patient must still be "uniquely dangerous" in order for the
care provider to owe a duty to that potential victim. Higgins, 855 P.2d at 240 (citing
Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1162). Because Plaintiffs do not allege sufficient facts to show that
Patient was likely to harm his estranged wife, it does not matter whether she was an
"identifiable" potential victim.
3. "Foreseeability" in Health Care Context.
Plaintiffs ask this Court to presume the truth of their allegation that the murder was
a "foreseeable" result of the alleged negligent treatment. (Br. of Appellants p. 20-21.)
They implicitly invoke traditional Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) analysis, under which wellpleaded factual allegations are presumed to be true. That approach is wrong in this case,
for two reasons.
First, under Young and this Court's mental health cases, Plaintiffs' "foreseeability"
allegations are not relevant. The "necessary prerequisite" of "custody or control," or an
otherwise "special" care provider-patient relationship, has not been established.
Therefore, under Young, 2002 UT 64 f 17 n.7, 52 P.3d at 1234 n.7, no "foreseeability of
harm" analysis is done.
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Second, in the health care context of this case, "foreseeability" is properly
encompassed within the "special relationship" analysis. A provider-patient relationship
may become "special," and give rise to a duty toward non-patients, when the patient is
dangerous and "likely" to harm others. Thus the "special relationship" analysis plainly
includes "foreseeability."
Dangerous behavior is difficult to foresee, because of the "empirically
demonstrated inability of trained healthcare professionals to reliably predict future
dangerousness . . . . " Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235. In other words, as a matter of science,
Patient's crime (or his "violent outburst," as Plaintiffs call it) was not foreseeable—at
least not on the facts alleged by Plaintiffs. Compare Higgins, 855 P.2d at 240 (duty could
exist to non-patient victim, "if reasonable action would have revealed that [patient] was
likely to inflict grievous bodily harm on [victim]"). As stated by another court: "Unless a
patient makes specific threats, the possibility that he may inflict injury on another is
vague, speculative, and a matter of conjecture." Brady v. Hopper, 570 F.Supp. 1333,
1338 (D. Colo. 1983), aff'd, 751 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984). In other words, for violent
behavior to become "foreseeable," given the scientific limits of predictive ability, the
patient must manifest clear warnings of dangerousness.
Therefore, Plaintiffs' "foreseeability" allegations are not merely owed no
presumption of correctness: they fail. Neither the allegedly mis-prescribed medications,
nor the "marital problems," nor the "restraining order," individually or together, made
Patient likely to harm others, known or unknown. His relationship with Defendants did
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not change to one that was sufficiently "special" to create a duty running from Defendants
to the non-patient Plaintiffs.
4. Policy Considerations Against Plaintiffs' Claims.
This Court's mental health case law is consistent with important policies that limit
the circumstances under which a health care provider may have a duty toward a nonpatient. Most prominently, there is a policy permitting people to receive health care in a
confidential, supportive setting. Care provider duties to non-patients are limited, in order
to "protect[] the traditional confidentiality of the provider/patient relationship, which is
important both for privacy reasons and for the efficacy of the therapeutic relationship."
Higgins, 855 P.2d at 239.
The importance of such confidentiality is highlighted in Sorensen v. Barbuto, 2008
UT 8, 177 P.3d 614. In Sorensen, this Court held that the health care duty of
confidentiality is "fiduciary," commanding loyalty to the patient:
A physician's duty of confidentiality encompasses the broad principle that
prohibits a physician from disclosing information received through the
physician-patient relationship. The duty is rooted in the ethical
underpinnings of this relationship and serves to prevent a physician from
disclosing sensitive medical information to any third party. It arises from
the understanding that good medical care requires a patient's trust and
confidence that disclosures to physicians will be used solely for the
patient's welfare and that a patient's privacy with regard to those
disclosures will be respected and protected.
2008 UT 8 f 12, 177 P.3d at 617. Consistent with the above-enunciated principles, this
Court's mental health law permits breach of patient trust, and action to protect a non-
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patient's interest, only when the patient is "uniquely dangerous," giving rise to a serious
safety concern.
In their attempt to avoid this Court's mental health case law and its related
policies, Plaintiffs in this case disclaim any "failure to protect" theory. They told the trial
court: "The Complaint here has nothing to do with a duty to warn or to provide
protection. Rather, the claim is that Defendants' negligence caused the patient to become
violent." (R. 264, Opp. to Motion to Dismiss, emphasis added.) On appeal, Plaintiffs
similarly disclaim any such theory, asserting that it would impose an unwarranted "extra
responsibility" upon health care providers. (Br. of Appellants p. 9.) The only duty they
impose here, Plaintiffs assert, is the duty to "choose a medically acceptable course of
treatment." (Id.)
Defendants repeat: Any duty was owed to Patient, it was not owed to Plaintiffs.
While Plaintiffs may not be attempting to impose any extra duty upon health care
providers, they certainly are attempting to impose substantial extra liability risk.
Plaintiffs' theory, if accepted, would improperly open every treatment decision to
challenge from non-patients, any time that the patient allegedly harms someone. Every
treatment decision would be made under such cloud of uncertainty. Care providers'
loyalty to their patients would be eroded by concerns that malpractice might be alleged by
some non-patient(s). Under Plaintiffs' theory, a non-patient could sue a care provider for
"negligent prescribing" even if the patient is satisfied with the care.
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That theory violates settled legal policy. Besides judicial policy commanding
primary loyalty to the patient, Utah's legislature has placed limits upon health care
malpractice liability. Utah's Health Care Malpractice Act expresses the policy concerns
as follows:
The Legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and claims for
damages and the amount of judgments and settlements arising from health
care has increased greatly in recent years. Because of these increases the
insurance industry has substantially increased the cost of medical
malpractice insurance. The effect of increased insurance premiums and
increased claims is increased health care cost, both through the health care
providers passing the cost of premiums to the patient and through the
provider's practicing defensive medicine because he views a patient as a
potential adversary in a lawsuit. Further, certain health care providers are
discouraged from continuing to provide services because of the high cost
and possible unavailability of malpractice insurance.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-402(l) (West 2011) (full statute copied in Appx. 1).
This Court has criticized, to varying degrees, the above-quoted legislative
statement. E.g., Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 584-588 (Utah 1993); Juddv. Drezga, 2004
UT 91 Tf 45-49, 103 P.3d 135, 147-148 (Durham, J, dissenting, joined by Nehring, J.).
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs' theory in this case, if endorsed, would multiply the difficulties
that the Health Care Malpractice Act is designed to limit. Under Plaintiffs' theory, a
health care provider would face not only the risk that his or her patient will be a "potential
adversary in a lawsuit." The provider would also face a risk that any >?6w-patient, critical
of the patient's care, and claiming to be harmed by the patient, would be a potential
litigation adversary. Such non-patient adversary would not even need the actual patient's
support or involvement—which is the posture of this case.
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The Utah legislature and this Court have crafted carefully circumscribed situations
in which a health care provider may become liable to a non-patient. Legislatively, actions
for wrongful death and for loss of consortium have been created. See Utah Code Ann. §§
78B-3-106 (wrongful death), 30-2-11 (loss of consortium) (West 2011). These are
subject to their own limitations, and to the limitations and policies embodied in the Health
Care Malpractice Act. Case law, as explained, limits other such actions to situations
wherein the patient has become "uniquely dangerous," giving rise to a duty to protect
non-patients.
Plaintiffs' "negligent prescribing" claim in this case, untethered by any "duty to
protect" limitation, would plainly violate such settled judicial and legislative policy. It
would improperly intrude upon the care provider-patient relationship when, as in this
case, the patient has brought no such claim. Because of this, Plaintiffs' claims in this case
should be rejected.
5. No "Negligent Prescribing" Claims for Non-Patients,
Plaintiffs cite no Utah case wherein a non-patient has been permitted to pursue a
"negligent prescribing" claim against a health care provider, unconnected to a "duty to
protect," under circumstances similar to this case. Defendants can find no such case.
Instead, it appears that when such claims are made, this Court analyzes them within the
"special relationship" and "duty to protect" framework. Such was the case in Wilson,
wherein this Court recited that plaintiffs alleged only negligent failure to "properly
treat[]" the patient, 969 P.2d at 417; the Court analyzed that claim under a "duty to
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protect" framework, id at 418-420.
The non-Utah case most analogous to this one appears to be Webb v. Jarvis, 575
N.E.2d 992 (Indiana 1991), a case that rejected a "negligent prescribing" claim with no
apparent "duty to protect" component. Webb v. Jarvis involved a physician who
allegedly mis-prescribed anabolic steroids for his patient. The patient got into a dispute
with his wife, during which he shot and wounded the wife's brother-in-law, who was
trying to protect her.
The wounded brother-in-law sued the doctor. He alleged that the steroids had
turned the patient "into a toxic psychotic who was unable to control his rages." 575
N.E.2d at 994. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the doctor had no duty toward the
non-patient brother-in-law, and ordered summary judgment for the doctor. While
applying a multi-factor analysis, the Indiana Supreme Court's holding is significant for
the "public policy" factor, which "weigh[ed] heavily against" a duty to the non-patient.
Specifically, the court declined to erode a physician's loyalty to the patient, by imposing a
conflicting duty toward "unknown persons." 575 N.E.2d at 997. It also held that "the
social utility derived from prescription medication can hardly be disputed and far
outweighs the risk of harm to third parties." Id
Plaintiffs here may try to distinguish Webb v. Jarvis on the basis of the non-patient
being an "unknown" potential victim. But as already explained, that distinction does not
matter under this Court's mental health law, wherein a patient must be "uniquely
dangerous" before a duty may arise to a known or unknown potential victim.
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Furthermore, in Webb v. Jarvis, the non-patient was a member of the "known" victim's
family, trying to protect the "known" victim. As such, he was a "foreseeable victim" of
the patient's criminal conduct, to the same degree as Plaintiffs in this case, who are the
murder victim's children.
Webb v. Jarvis is also significant for its analysis of "foreseeability," which under
Utah mental health law is encompassed within "special relationship" analysis and the
prediction of dangerousness. "The causal connection between the use of steroids and
violent behavior, if any, is simply not as well-established as are the physical effects of
ingesting alcohol." 575 N.E.2d at 997. Thus the Indiana Supreme Court granted no
presumption of correctness to the plaintiffs allegation that steroid medications made the
patient dangerous.
Another instructive, albeit less similar, situation was presented in Lester v. Hall,
126 N.M. 404, 970 P.2d 590 (1998). In Lester, the defendant physician prescribed
lithium for the patient. Subsequently, the patient caused an automobile accident, injuring
a non-patient.
The injured non-patient sued the physician for malpractice, alleging that the
physician had negligently prescribed the lithium, specifically by failing to properly
monitor the patient's blood lithium level, and that the physician had failed to warn the
patient that the lithium might impair his ability to drive. 970 P.2d at 591. The New
Mexico Supreme Court held that under those alleged facts, the defendant physician had
no duty of care to the non-patient.
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The New Mexico Supreme Court, similar to the Indiana court in Webb v. Jarvis,
found no foreseeability that the allegedly mis-prescribed lithium would cause a motor
vehicle accident: "[T]he likelihood of injury to [plaintiff] is not foreseeable to the degree
required in order to warrant a duty." Lester v. Hall, 970 P.2d at 592. Also, the court was
persuaded by policy concerns to not judicially expand tort liability against health care
providers. Such policy, the court observed, was supported by New Mexico's Medical
Malpractice Act, which (like its Utah counterpart) expresses a legislative "judgment to
circumscribe the malpractice liability of health care providers . . . . " 970 P.2d at 593-594.
The New Mexico Supreme Court also observed that most "negligent prescribing"
cases are founded not simply upon allegations of mis-prescribing per se, but rather, upon
failure to warn of potential side effects. 970 P.2d at 596-598 (canvassing cases). Thus
most such cases fall within the framework of this Court's mental health law: if a known
side effect poses a known risk of danger, a "duty to protect" non-patients may arise.
As noted earlier, Plaintiffs in this case expressly disclaim any "failure to protect"
theory. They propose a dramatic, unprecedented expansion of health care provider
liability. They propose that they, as non-patients, should be permitted to "step into
Patient's shoes" to pursue a "negligent prescribing" theory, divorced from any theory of
"failure to protect," and divorced from any other established exception to the usual rule
that only the patient may sue the care provider. Based upon sound precedent and policy,
this Court should affirm the trial court's decision that Plaintiffs may not so proceed.
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B
The Generic "Normandeau" Analysis Does Not
Support Plaintiffs' Claims.
Plaintiffs urge application of a "generic" analysis, for existence of a duty,
announced in Normandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc. (^'Normandeau IF), 2009 UT 44,
215 P.3d 152. (Br. of Appellants p. 19-25.) Normandeau involved an allegedly negligent
repair to a truck. The repaired component explosively failed, killing a tow truck driver.
2009 UT 44 f 2, 215 P.3d at 154-155. Obviously, the factual context of Normandeau is
far removed from this health care case.
The Normandeau "duty" analysis does provide a framework to address some of
Plaintiffs' arguments not already addressed herein. It also permits brief reiteration of
some points already made. The Normandeau duty analysis looks at the following factors:
(1) the legal relationship between the parties; (2) foreseeability of injury; (3) likelihood of
injury; (4) public policy as to "which party can best bear the loss;" and (5) "other general
policy considerations." Normandeau II, 2009 UT 44 f 19, 215 P.3d at 158. While
Defendants urge reconsideration of the fourth factor, these factors otherwise support the
dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims.
1. Legal Relationship Between the Parties.
As explained earlier, health care providers have a strong duty of loyalty to their
patients. That duty cannot be breached, in the interests of non-patients, unless the patient
clearly shows that he or she is likely to harm others. In this case, the Defendant health
care providers were prohibited from subverting Patient's interests to those of any non28

patient(s). If anything, under the "marital discord" circumstances alleged by Plaintiffs,
Defendants had a heightened duty toward Patient—to support him, emotionally and
confidentially, when his wife no longer could or would do so.
In conclusory fashion, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants had a duty toward them, as
"the family of the patient being treated." (Br. of Appellants p. 20.) They offer no
analysis, and no law, to explain why that family relationship, with Patient, should trump
Defendant's judicially-protected loyalty to Patient.
Plaintiffs elsewhere argue that no "special relationship" analysis is appropriate in
this case. They cite this Court's effort, in Webb v. University of Utah, 2005 UT 80, 125
P.3d 906, to clarify the "special relationship" concept. (Br. of Appellants p. 15-19.)
Webb v. University of Utah was a slip-and-fall case, not a health care malpractice case.
Whatever merit Plaintiffs' argument might have in a non-health care context, such
is lacking in this case. As previously explained, this Court's mental health cases plainly
require that for a health care provider to be liable to a non-patient, for harm inflicted by
the patient, the patient must be in a "special relationship" with, or in the "custody or
control" of, the care provider. "Special relationship" analysis figured prominently in
Wilson, 969 P.2d at 419-420, Higgins, 855 P.2d at 236-237, and Rollins, 813 P.2d at
1159-1161. There is no indication that Webb v. University of Utah overrules these cases,
or even undercuts them, to any degree.
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2. Foreseeability of Injury.
This Court has stated that "foreseeability," in assessing duty, inquires whether a
"reasonable person" could foresee a likelihood that harm will be caused by particular
conduct. AMS Salt Industries, Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of America, 942 P.2d 315, 321
(Utah 1997). The "reasonable person" approach is a court function. Normandeau
involved a defective truck repair that, as a matter of physics, created a specific,
mechanically predictable, physical safety hazard. Cruz v. MiddlekauffLincoln-Mercury,
909 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1996), also cited by Plaintiffs, involved a car dealership that
repeatedly left keys in its automobiles—increasing theft risk, as a matter of common
sense. As such, "foreseeability" in those cases was straightforward from a "reasonable
person" perspective.
Certain health care situations, hypothesized by Plaintiffs, do foreseeably pose
hazards, and concomitant duties, to non-patients. (Br. of Appellants pp. 14-15, 20.)
Administering sedative or narcotic medications, and then allowing the patient to drive
while in an impaired state, presents a readily understood and well-known safety risk.
E.g., Lester v. Hall, 970 P.2d at 592 (lithium does not present equivalent safety risk as
narcotic injection). Improper care and counseling of a patient who has an infectious
disease could also foreseeably harm non-patients, such that a duty could extend to them.
In such situations, established and well-known concepts of pharmacology and infectious
disease may support foreseeability.
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Those situations are not analogous to this case. In Higgins, this Court flatly
rejected the non-patient plaintiffs argument that an infectious disease is analogous to
mental illness. 855 P.2d at 236 n.4. Higgins defeats Plaintiffs' effort, in this case, to
make that same analogy. (Br. of Appellants p. 14-15.)
This case involves highly complex and incompletely understood possible
interactions of pharmacology, general human behavior, personality traits, and troubled
marital relationships. Over two weeks elapsed between Patient's last visit to Nurse West
and the murder. In Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d at 997, arising from strikingly similar
circumstances, the Indiana Supreme Court found no "foreseeability" in a case alleging
improper prescription of anabolic steroids. Based upon the allegations in this lawsuit, to
hold that Defendants should have foreseen Patient's intentional crime, as a result of his
medications, would be to improperly hold Defendants to a duty of clairvoyance. No
reasonable person would impose such duty; neither should this Court.
3. Likelihood of Injury,
This Normandeau factor appears to overlap the "foreseeability" factor. Plaintiffs
allege that Patient shot his estranged wife after he had been taking his medications for
over five months; the last dosage adjustment was over two weeks before the murder.
(Amended Complaint, R. 22-23.) Cf. Lester v. Hall, 970 P.2d at 592-593 (physician did
not have duty to non-patient, where the accident caused by patient occurred five days
after last physician visit). Plaintiffs' vague allegations of "toxic side effects" from
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medications, "marital difficulties" and a "restraining order," as already argued, did not
make the murder of his estranged wife foreseeable; nor did it make that tragedy likely.
That a tragedy occurred cannot be denied. But the likelihood of such tragedy,
given the uneventful course of Patient's treatment before the murder, was extremely
remote. Defendants' duty should not be assessed by hindsight. Higgins, 855 P.2d at 236
("hindsight bias" must be avoided in assessing duty).
4. Public Policy as to "Which Party Can Best Bear the Loss. "
Before the trial court, Plaintiffs applied this factor as follows: "Defendants and
their insurers are better situated to bear the cost of this loss." (R. 255.) Of course, not all
health care providers are wealthy, and some do not carry malpractice insurance. In any
event, this Normandeau factor appears to be of questionable origin. Accordingly,
Defendants ask this Court to reconsider it.
In Normandeau II, this Court seemingly cited the following passage, from AMS
Salt Industries, for the proposition that consideration of "who can best bear the loss" is
another factor in determining duty:
Whether the law imposes a duty does not depend upon foreseeability alone.
The likelihood of injury, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against it
and the consequences of placing that burden upon defendant, must also be
taken into account.... A duty may also be found on the basis of reasonable
mutual reliance, voluntary conduct which increases the risk of harm, and
general policy considerations.

7

On appeal, Plaintiffs do not urge this "bear the loss" approach in the same way.
Instead, they invoke one of their main themes, that "malfeasance" supports a duty even if
"nonfeasance" would not. (Br. of Appellants p. 24-25.)
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AMS Salt Industries, 942 P.2d at 321 (quoting authority, internal citations and quotations
omitted), cited in Normandeau II, 2009 UT 44 % 19, 215 P.3d at 158. It is not clear how,
from the just-quoted passage, the Court in Normandeau II decided that the question of
"who can best bear the loss" is a factor in deciding duty.
To overrule a precedent consisting of an entire case, a "substantial burden of
persuasion" must be carried. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399-400 (Utah 1994)
(overruling 19-year precedent about jury selection). However, this Court is more willing
to overrule precedent that has "weak analytical underpinnings." Id. at 399-400. It is also
willing to overrule statements that, on subsequent review, appear to be minor components
of an otherwise sound holding, or statements that have not been thoroughly scrutinized.
E.g., Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91 f 20-21, 173 P.3d 848, 852 (overruling a
single paragraph, in a prior case, that appeared "almost as an afterthought"); Utahnsfor
Better Dental Health v. Davis County Clerk, 2007 UT 97 \ 6-8, 175 P.3d 1036, 10381039 (overruling a prior "standard of review" rule that had been adopted without close
examination). Revisitation of the "bear the loss" factor, for determining duty, appears
appropriate in this case, for similar reasons.
Another problem with the "bear the loss" factor is that it supports the imposition of
strict liability, without regard to actual fault, upon a party who appears to have resources
to satisfy a judgment. The defense has found few other jurisdictions that apply a "bear
the loss" factor to decide whether a duty exists. None of those jurisdictions seem to have
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analyzed the "bear the loss" factor closely. Also, the "bear the loss" factor conflicts with
Utah legislative intent regarding health care malpractice, as previously discussed.
Accordingly, it seems appropriate for this Court to overrule the "bear the loss" factor in
determining duty, or at least to reject it in the health care malpractice context. It should
not be dispositive of the "duty" analysis in this case.
5. Other General Policy Considerations.
This open-ended "duty" factor provides an opportunity to address the non-patient
Plaintiffs' additional reasoning as to why they should be permitted to sue the Defendant
health care providers. Sound policy counsels against them.
Citing Webb v. University of Utah, the slip-and-fall case, Plaintiffs highlight
purported distinctions between "malfeasance and nonfeasance." They argue that Nurse
West committed "malfeasance" by prescribing "improper medications," and therefore,

*See University of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54, 57 n.2 (Colo. 1987) ("capacity
of the parties to bear the loss" is among various factors "that have been given conscious
or unconscious weight by the courts"); 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v.
Finlandia Center, Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097, 1101 (N.Y. 2001) ("reparation allocation" as a
factor). Indiana looks at the relationship of the parties, the foreseeability of the harm, and
"public policy issues" generally. Hooks SuperX, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 642 N.E.2d 514,
517 (Indiana 1994); but see Ousley v. Board of Commas of Fulton County, 734 N.E.2d
290, 294 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) ("bear the loss" factor included). New Mexico "carefully
balanc[es]" the "likelihood of injury, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against it,
and the consequences of placing that burden upon the defendant." Lester v. Hall, 970
P.2d at 592. Tennessee applies a seven-factor analysis, with no "bear the loss" factor.
Satterfieldv. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.2d 347, 365 (Tenn. 2008). Without
"privity of contract between the parties," California examines at least six factors, without
mention of "who bears the loss." Greenberg v. Superior Court, 111 Cal.App.41 1339,
1347, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 96, 102 (2009).
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she had a duty toward them. They imply that if she merely committed "nonfeasance," she
would have no duty to them. (Br. of Appellants pp. 8-10, 22.) That argument, if
accepted, provides additional reason to affirm the trial court's dismissal order as to
codefendants Dr. Rodier and Pioneer Clinic, who are not alleged, by Plaintiffs, to have
provided any "affirmative" or direct care to Patient.9
In any event, Plaintiffs derive their "malfeasance-nonfeasance" distinction from
case law unrelated to health care.10 That distinction is not supported by this Court's
mental health case law. Higgins, 855 P.2d at 240; Wilson, 969 P.2d at 420 (addressing a
possible duty arising from a failure to diagnose, indicating "nonfeasance," not
"malfeasance").
Cases from other jurisdictions show that tragedy can easily arise from
"nonfeasance," or failure to diagnose and treat mental conditions. In Tarasoffv. Regents
9

Indeed, Plaintiffs maintain that they are not required to establish a special
relationship because they have alleged affirmative acts on the part of the defendants. See
Br. of Appellees pp. 7, 16, 17. Plaintiffs argue that "plaintiff has to show a 'special
relationship' only where a claim is based on an omission or a failure to act." Id. at 16.
Accordingly, then, because Plaintiffs' claims against Dr. Rodier are based entirely on his
failure to act, i.e., nonfeasance, see Amended Complaint at f44, they must establish a
special relationship between Dr. Rodier and the Patient. Because Dr. Rodier never even
met the Patient, Plaintiffs' claims against Dr. Rodier necessarily fail under their own
argument.
10
Cases cited by Plaintiffs for their "malfeasance versus nonfeasance" distinction
(Br. of Appellants p. 10 n.2) are outside the health care context of this case. See
University of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54 (Colo. 1987) (student trampoline accident
at fraternity); Satterfieldv. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347 (Tenn. 2008)
(secondary asbestos exposure to child of insulation worker); Williams v. Cunningham
Drug Stores, Inc., 429 Mich. 495, 418 N.W.2d 381(1988) (store customer shot by
robber); Seo v. All-Makes Overhead Doors, 97 Cal.App.4th 1193, 119 Cal.Rptr. 160
(property subtenant injured by sliding door).
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of the University of California, 17 Cal.3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14 (1976), a
therapist allegedly failed to intervene when a patient allegedly expressed an intention,
later carried out, to kill a specific victim. The therapist was held to have a potential duty
of care toward the non-patient victim. Tedrick v. Community Resource Center, Inc., et
al9 235 IU.2d 155, 920 N.E.2d 220 (2009), involved a patient who was allegedly not
adequately treated for what appears to have been serious mental illness; he killed his wife.
920 N.E.2d at 222-223 (reciting allegations of "paranoid delusions" and other symptoms
that care providers allegedly failed to "properly diagnose, treat, and monitor"). In
Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Center, et al.9 77 Ohio St.3d 284, 673 N.E.2d
1311 (1997), mental health care providers were held potentially liable for failing to
adequately diagnose and treat the patient; after a doctor discontinued his antipsychotic
medications, the patient decompensated and killed his parents. Brady v. Hopper, 570
F.Supp. 1333 (D. Colo. 1983), affd, 751 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984), involved a mentally
disturbed man, allegedly not adequately treated, who shot President Reagan.
Suicide is widely understood to be a tragic consequence of untreated mental
illness, particularly depression. Failure to diagnose and treat depression would be
"nonfeasance," not "malfeasance," yet potentially actionable if the patient commits
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suicide.11
Plainly, Plaintiffs' "malfeasance versus nonfeasance" distinction makes no sense
in the context of mental health treatment. Its adoption in this case, as urged by Plaintiffs,
would create an improper incentive to not provide needed care. See Wilson v. Valley
Mental Health, 969 P.2d at 420 (expressing concern that Utah's "duty to protect" statute,
applicable to therapists, may create incentive to not adequately inquire into a patient's
mental condition). The likely result would be more tragedies, not fewer, as treatable
problems become worse due to lack of care.
The "public versus private actor" distinction, also urged by Plaintiffs, also makes
no sense in this health care context. Quoting this Court, Plaintiffs state that
"governmental actors" need judicial protection from negligence claims. (Br. of Appellants
p. 16-17.) However, such actors normally have statutory immunity, under Utah Code
Ann. § 63G-7-101 through 63G-7-904 (West 2011). Even if government workers need
extra liability protection in order to maintain the "pool of potential public servants," it is
equally valid to hold that extra protection is due to health care providers, whether publicly
or privately employed, in order to maintain a pool of these vitally-needed workers.
In sum, under the Normandeau analysis, no duty, and no potential civil liability,
existed between the non-patient Plaintiffs and the Defendant health care providers. For

Plaintiffs' analogy to suicide (Br. of Appellants p. 20) simply is unpersuasive.
Patient murdered somebody else; he did not take his own life. Had he committed suicide,
a wrongful death claim, based on his death, could have proceeded.
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this reason, as well as this Court's mental health case law, this Court should affirm the
dismissal of Plaintiffs' amended complaint.
POINT II
PATIENT'S ADMISSION TO INTENTIONALLY KILLING
HIS WIFE BARS PLAINTIFFS5 CLAIM THAT PATIENT'S
MEDICATIONS CAUSED HIM TO KILL HER
Summary judgment is appropriate, under Utah R. Civ. P. 56, when there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Bare allegations in pleadings do not create a factual dispute, if such
allegations are rebutted by admissible record evidence. Poteet v. White, 2006 UT 63 f 7,
147 P.3d 439, 441 (citing authority).
A
Judicial Notice of Criminal Proceedings
Defendants' alternative and additional motion, for summary judgment, relied upon
materials outside the pleadings in this lawsuit—specifically, the record of David
Ragsdale's criminal prosecution. The pertinent portions of that record were placed into
the trial court record in this case, and so are before this Court for appellate review. See
Carter v. Carter, 563 P.2d 177, 178 (Utah 1977) (judicial notice may be taken of
proceedings in another case so long as files from the other proceedings are introduced and
disclosed).
The facts in the criminal case record not subject to reasonable dispute, and
Plaintiffs have not disputed them. Under those facts, summary judgment, in favor of
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Defendants, is proper as an alternative or additional ground to affirm the trial court's
judgment in this case. This is proper, even though the trial court rejected this ground.
State v. South, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996).
B
By Waiving any "Involuntary Intoxication" Defense,
Patient Admitted that his Medications Did Not
Cause Him to Murder his Estranged Wife.
Plaintiffs claim that Patient killed his estranged wife, Kristy, due to the influence
of his allegedly mis-prescribed medications. However, Patient waived that claim. He did
so when he pled guilty to aggravated murder, including his express admission that he
"intentionally or knowingly" killed his wife. (Fact 119-23.) Aggravated murder requires
the "intentional or knowing" mental state. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (West 2011).
The "diminished capacity" defenses of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (West 2011)
include "involuntary intoxication" due to prescription medications. State v. Gardner, 870
P.2d 900 (Utah 1993). Those defenses can defeat the criminal intent, or mens rea,
required to commit a particular crime. Therefore, by admitting that he acted
"intentionally or knowingly," Patient admitted that he did not act while involuntarily
intoxicated. That is, he admitted that his medications did not cause him to kill his wife.
The significance of that waiver, made with the assistance of counsel, is heightened
in light of the relative burdens of proof. Had Patient gone to trial and presented just some
evidence to support an "involuntary intoxication" defense, the prosecution would have
been required to refute it under the strict "beyond reasonable doubt" standard. State v.
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Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 368 (Utah 1995) (burden of proving criminal mental state, beyond
reasonable doubt, remains with prosecution under section 76-2-305). Had the prosecution
failed to carry that burden, Ragsdale would have been acquitted of aggravated murder.
Patient also could have raised involuntary intoxication as a partial defense, seeking
a conviction for a lower degree of offense. One possibility was non-aggravated murder,
which can be committed with mental states less culpable than "intentional or knowing."
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (West 2011). Alternatively, or additionally, a jury could
have returned a verdict of "guilty and mentally ill at the time of the offense," due to
involuntary intoxication. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-102 (West 2011).
Assisted by counsel throughout the criminal proceedings, Patient asserted no
involuntary intoxication defense, for any of the above-described purposes. It is clear,
from comments at the plea hearing and the sentencing hearing (Fact ff 13, 17,24, 27),
that the possibility of doing so was prominently considered by Patient and his counsel,
and was well-known to the criminal court. When Patient pled guilty to "intentionally or
knowingly" murdering his estranged wife, he conclusively waived the involuntary
intoxication defense, and any other "diminished capacity" defenses.12 He admitted that he
did not kill her because of involuntary intoxication.

By comparison, in Higgins, the mental health patient, who stabbed the victim,
was found "guilty and mentally ill" of attempted homicide, which offense was
subsequently reduced to attempted manslaughter. 855 P.2d at 234 & n.2. The patient in
Wilson, who killed one person and injured another, was convicted of manslaughter and
aggravated assault, under "guilty and mentally ill" pleas. 969 P.2d at 417.
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Now, in their civil complaint against Patient's health care providers, Plaintiffs
demand a trial, to prove that Patient did not intentionally murder his wife, but rather,
killed her because of "toxic side effects from the combination of his prescribed
medications." (Amended Complaint, R. 22, 25 Iff 29, 37.) In effect, they demand a trial
to prove that Patient is innocent of aggravated murder; instead, "the medications made
him do it."
That demand should be rejected. Patient's mental state, at the time of the murder,
has been conclusively litigated in his criminal prosecution. Based upon issue preclusion
(Plaintiffs prefer the term "collateral estoppel"), Patient clearly could not re-litigate this
issue. Plaintiffs, proposing to "step into Patient's shoes," should also be barred from relitigating it. In other words, their rights should be no greater than Patient's.
C
Why Issue Preclusion Bars Plaintiffs' Claim that
Patient's Medications Caused Him to Kill his Wife.
The elements of issue preclusion are:
(1) The party against whom issue preclusion is asserted was a party, or in
privity with a party, in the prior litigation.
(2) The issue decided in the prior litigation must be identical to the one
presented in the subsequent litigation.
(3) The issue in the prior litigation must have been completely, fully, and
fairly litigated.
(4) The prior litigation must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
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Jensen ex rel Jensen v. Cunningham, 2011 UT 17 141, 250 P.3d 465, 476-477. This
Court has stated that issue preclusion applies "only" when the above four elements are
satisfied. Id.
This very unusual case does not implicate issue preclusion in its usual, classical
sense. If issue preclusion can only apply when its elements are strictly and exactly
satisfied, as implied Jensen v. Cunningham, supra, then Defendants cannot prevail on this
point.
However, this Court has elsewhere stated that issue preclusion serves several
important judicial policies: "(1) preserving the integrity of the judicial system by
preventing inconsistent judicial outcomes; (2) promoting judicial economy by preventing
previously litigated issues from being re-litigated; and (3) preventing litigants from
harassment by vexatious litigation." Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78 f 14, 99 P.3d 842,
847. This case clearly implicates the first two policies. Judicial integrity is implicated,
because Plaintiffs seek a civil judgment with respect to Patient's crime -"the medications
made him do it"—that would be opposite to the outcome of the criminal prosecution—
"the medications did not make him do it." Judicial economy is also implicated, because
Plaintiffs' civil claims, if allowed to proceed, will entail the re-examination of evidence
that has already been examined, and found lacking, in Patient's criminal prosecution.
It therefore appears proper, in this unusual case, to apply issue preclusion in a way
that promotes its underpinning goals. To do so, this Court should hold as follows
regarding the elements of issue preclusion:
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1. Privity.
Plaintiffs were not formal parties to the criminal prosecution. However, they
properly should be regarded, via their maternal grandparents, who have apparently
adopted them, as being in privity with the prosecution. The grandparents were consulted
about and approved Patient's guilty plea to aggravated murder. (Factfflf18, 26.) They
spoke for Plaintiffs at Patient's sentencing. (Id.) In short, Plaintiffs exercised their crime
victim rights under Utah law. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-1 et seq. (West 2010); Utah
Const. Art. I § 28. In their exercise of those rights, Plaintiffs agreed with Patient's
admission that he did not kill his estranged wife, Plaintiffs' mother, due to the influence
of his prescription medications.
Additionally, there appears to be no legitimate reason why Patient is not a party to
this lawsuit. He certainly is a person "who has an interest relating to the subject matter"
of this lawsuit, as well as a person over whom the trial court could exercise jurisdiction.
Accordingly, he could feasibly be joined as a party plaintiff under Utah R. Civ. P. 19.
Plaintiffs have offered no reason why they have not joined him. See Utah R. Civ. P. 19(c)
(if any feasible party is not joined, then pleader must explain why). The only apparent
reason is that Plaintiffs wish to avoid application of issue preclusion to this lawsuit.
Such manipulation should be barred as a matter of judicial policy. A reasonably
flexible application of the "privity" rule, to the singular circumstances of this case, will
accomplish this.
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2. Identical Issue.
It is undeniable that Plaintiffs seek a result, in this case, that is opposite to a central
finding in the criminal case. Patient is serving a life prison sentence, based upon his
voluntary, fully-counseled admission that his medications did not cause him to kill his
estranged wife. Plaintiffs now pursue a "medications made him do it" civil verdict.
Attempting to avoid or minimize this conflict, Plaintiffs assert, without analysis,
that "most simply, the issue of intent in the criminal case, and proximate cause in a civil
tort action, are not identical." They seemingly imply that Patient's medications were
merely "a" cause of the murder, with no indication as to what other causes may have
existed. (Br. of Appellants p. 28-29.)
The issue, properly defined, is: What caused Patient to form the criminal intent, or
mens rea, with which he acted? Quite plainly, with assistance of counsel and of medical
expertise, Patient considered and then waived his opportunity to assert that his intent was
influenced by his prescription medications. (Fact \ 24.) In the criminal case, Patient
admitted that he acted intentionally or knowingly—that is, with specific intent to kill.
Because of the differing burdens of criminal and civil proof, that admission leaves
no room for a civil verdict that Patient acted "partially intentionally" and "partially
because of the medications," which is apparently what Plaintiffs wish to argue. As
explained earlier, for a criminal "involuntary intoxication" defense to succeed, Patient
needed only to create a reasonable doubt whether he acted with specific intent to kill.
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When he waived that defense, Patient effectively conceded that his evidence did not raise
such reasonable doubt—a very low burden.
In this case, Plaintiffs would have to prove, by a substantially higher,
"preponderance of evidence" standard, that Patient did act under the influence of
involuntary intoxication. Therefore, it really does not matter whether, in this civil case,
Plaintiffs will concede that Patient's criminal intent was caused by some factor in
addition to his allegedly mis-prescribed medications. Patient has already consented to a
criminal adjudication that leaves no room for such a "partly intentional, partly
involuntary" civil verdict. The issue has already been decided, in a manner contrary to
Plaintiffs' current desires.
3. The Issue Was Litigated.
Plaintiffs argue that "[w]aiving a defense is not litigating an issue." (Br. of
Appellants p. 27.) Because Patient waived the "involuntary intoxication" defense via a
guilty plea, Plaintiffs argue, their present claim of "the medications made him do it" is not
barred by issue preclusion. Their argument does not account for the manner in which
Patient's waiver was made in the criminal court.
In compliance with longstanding Utah law and practice, the criminal court record
shows that great pains were taken to assure that there was no "mere" waiver of any of
Patient's rights and defenses. The criminal court carefully assured that he knowingly and
voluntarily pled guilty to aggravated murder. (Fact | | 22-23.) The "involuntary
intoxication" issue was prominently considered by everyone involved. (Factfflf13, 17,
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24, 25, 27.) Upon considering that possible defense, Patient admitted, in open court, to
intentionally or knowingly killing his wife—i.e., that he did not kill her due to involuntary
intoxication.
This Court has long insisted that criminal guilty pleas be taken with scrupulous
care. See State v. Lovell, 2011 UT 36ffif7, 12-17,

P.3d

,

(tracing history of

"strict compliance" rule for accepting guilty pleas). When so taken, convictions founded
upon guilty pleas are just as reliable as those founded upon guilty verdicts. Furthermore,
in general, the term "litigate" includes these definitions: "To dispute or contend in form
of law; to settle a dispute or seek relief in a court of law; to carry on a suit;...; to
prosecute or defend by pleadings, evidence, and debate in a court." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 841 (5th Ed. 1979) (emphasis added). Patient's criminal conviction, in this
case, included a knowing, voluntary settlement of the dispute whether he acted with the
specific intent required for aggravated murder.
The criminal case record makes this clear. The "intent" issue, with respect to
criminal mens rea, was prominently addressed during the change-of-plea hearing, and
again during sentencing. At the latter proceeding, the criminal court specifically rejected
Patient's self-serving and contradictory suggestion that "the medications made him do it,"
observing that the murder was a "moment of incalculable cruelty and selfishness" by
Patient. The court was "convinced that he knew exactly what he was doing." (Fact f 27.)
"Clearly, if an issue is actually raised by proper pleadings and treated as an issue
in a case, it is conclusively determined by the first judgment." Maoris & Assocs. v.
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Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93 % 40, 16 P.3d 1214, 1223. By charging Patient with intentional
or knowing murder, the criminal prosecutors raised his mental state, at the time of the
shooting, in the criminal pleadings. By squarely treating the "involuntary intoxication"
defense as an issue, and ultimately waiving that defense on the record, Patient, with
assistance of counsel, knowingly permitted it to be conclusively rejected, in the criminal
prosecution. Issues that are raised, carefully examined, and knowingly waived, have been
"litigated."
4. Final Judgment.
Plaintiffs appropriately concede that Patient's criminal prosecution proceeded to
final judgment. (Br. of Appellants p. 26 n.12.) But it is worth considering, as a matter of
judicial policy, that Plaintiffs' civil cause of action, if allowed to proceed, seeks a result
that could call the validity of Patient's criminal conviction into question. In urging that
Patient killed his estranged wife due to the influence of his medications, Plaintiffs are
effectively arguing that Patient is innocent of aggravated murder.
In effect, Plaintiffs' efforts in this case may be viewed as an effort, intentional or
otherwise, to undermine that final, criminal judgment. The prospect that Patient might try
to raise his own "actual innocence" claim, based upon Plaintiffs' efforts in this case, is
troubling. Plaintiffs may deny any intention to permit that to happen, but that choice is
out of their hands.
Utah's criminal and civil courts operate under different rules, but they do not
inhabit different realities. At best, what Plaintiffs desire in this lawsuit is two opposite
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adjudications: in the criminal case, "the medications did not make him do it;" in their
proposed civil claims, "the medications did make him do it." That is no prescription for
"preserving the integrity of the judicial system," Buckner v. Kennard, supra. Under a
policy-based approach to issue preclusion, this Court should hold that Plaintiffs' claims,
in this case, are barred.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained in Point I, this Court should affirm the trial court's
conclusion that the non-patient Plaintiffs, in this case, cannot pursue the "negligent
prescribing" claim that could be, but has not been, pursued by Patient. Alternatively or
additionally, as explained in Point II, this Court may hold that Plaintiffs are barred from
pursuing such "negligent prescribing" claim because the "causation" element of that
claim has been conclusively litigated in the criminal court. Ultimately, this Court should
AFFIRM the trial court's judgment of dismissal.
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
*lUtah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos)
*1 Part HI. Pleadings, Motions, and Orders
•+ RULE 12. DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a defendant shall serve an answer
within twenty days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete within the state and within thirty
days after service of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state. A party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer thereto within twenty days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply
to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court,
within twenty days after service of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this
rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the court, but a motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading does not affect the time for responding to the remaining claims:
(a)(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the merits, the responsive pleading
shall be served within ten days after notice of the court's action;
(a)(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten
days after the service of the more definite statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that
the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of
service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable
party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by norther pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for
relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at the
trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss
for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to
such a motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the
trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in subdivision (b) of this rule, whether
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made in a pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be
heard and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or
ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a
more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained
of and the details desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to which the motion
was directed or make such order as it deems just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is
permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court
may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may join with it the other motions
herein provided for and then available. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all
defenses and objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion, the party shall not thereafter
make a motion based on any of the defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this
rule.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by motion or by answer or
reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to
join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also be made by a
later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the
subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of
as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received.
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of such motion.
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No security shall be required of any
officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the
service of the order, the court shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action.
CREDIT(S)
[Amended effective September 4,1985; April 1, 1990; November 1, 2000.]
State court rules are current with amendments received through April 15, 2011
(C) 2011 Thomson Reuters
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
3iUtah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos)
*1 Part VII Judgment
-f RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7.
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole
case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist
without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which
the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as
are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that
the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary
judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a
party failing to file such a response.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the
party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be
taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
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(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and
any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
CREDIT(S)
[Amended effective November 1,1997; November 1,2004.]
State court rules are current with amendments received through April 15, 2011
(C) 2011 Thomson Reuters
END OF DOCUMENT
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Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-14-2

c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78B. Judicial Code
^Chapter 3. Actions and Venue
*8 Part 4. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (Refs & Annos)
-f § 78B-3-402. Legislative findings and declarations—Purpose of act
(1) The Legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and claims for damages and the amount of judgments
and settlements arising from health care has increased greatly in recent years. Because of these increases the
insurance industry has substantially increased the cost of medical malpractice insurance. The effect of increased
insurance premiums and increased claims is increased health care cost, both through the health care providers passing the cost of premiums to the patient and through the provider's practicing defensive medicine because he views a
patient as a potential adversary in a lawsuit. Further, certain health care providers are discouraged from continuing
to provide services because of the high cost and possible unavailability of malpractice insurance.
(2) In view of these recent trends and with the intention of alleviating the adverse effects which these trends are
producing in the public's health care system, it is necessary to protect the public interest by enacting measures designed to encourage private insurance companies to continue to provide health-related malpractice insurance while
at the same time establishing a mechanism to ensure the availability of insurance in the event that it becomes unavailable from private companies.
(3) In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the Legislature to provide a reasonable time in which actions may be
commenced against health care providers while limiting that time to a specific period for which professional liability
insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and to provide other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims.
CREDIT(S)
Current through 2011 General Session and First Special Session
(C) 2011 Thomson Reuters
END OF DOCUMENT
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Amended Complaint, R. 19-29

•TOSBR88F
MR 3 0 2010
SALT LAKE COUNTY

Tyler S.Young (11325)
Allen K. Young (3583)
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO
75 South 300 West
Provo,UT 84601
Telephone: (801) 379-0700
Facsimile: (801) 379-0701

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

B. R., a minor child, and C. R., a minor
child, through their conservator
WILLIAM M.JEFFS,
Plaintiffs,

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Civil No. 100907025
Judge : Denise Lindberg

v.
TRTNA WEST, A.F.N.P, HUGO
RODIER, M.D., and PIONEER
COMPREHENSIVE MEDICAL CLINIC
and JOHN DOES I - X ,

JURY TRIAL REQUESTED

Defendants.
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, Tyler S. Young and Allen
K. Young of Young, Kester & Petro, and for cause of action against the defendants
alleges as follows:
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.
Utah.

At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiffs were residents of Utah County,

2.

At all times relevant hereto, Trina West, Advanced Family Nurse

Practitioner (hereinafter "A.F.N.P."), was licensed by the State of Utah to practice
nursing at her principle place of business in Draper, Salt Lake County, Utah.
3.

At all times relevant hereto, Hugo Rodier, M.D., was licensed by the State

of Utah to practice medicine at his principle place of business in Draper, Salt Lake
County, Utah.
4.

At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Pioneer Comprehensive Medical

Clinic retained, hired, supervised and controlled its staff and employees, and supervised
as well as controlled, through granting of medical privileges, its medical staff at its place
of business in Salt Lake County, Utah.
5.

At all times relevant hereto, John Does I through X were persons or

entities residing in or doing business in Salt Lake County, Utah.
6.

The tortious acts complained of occurred in Salt Lake County, Utah.

7.

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter in accordance with the

provisions of Utah Code Annotated Utah Code Annotated 78A-5-102 (2008 as
Amended).
8.

Venue is properly laid with this Court in accordance with the provisions of

Utah Code Annotated Section 78B-3-307 (2008 as Amended).
9.

Plaintiff has met the requirements of Utah Health Care Malpractice Act,

Section 78B-3-412.
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FACTS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION
10.

Plaintiffs hereby reference and incorporate as if set forth herein the

allegations of paragraphs 1 through 9 and further allege as follows:
11.

Utah law allows an Advanced Family Nurse Practitioner, like Trina West,

to prescribe "Schedule II and III" controlled substances only in "consultation with" a
licensed medical doctor.
12.

On or about April 16, 2007 David Ragsdale began a regular course of

treatment at Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic with Trina West, A.F.N.P.
13.

On or about April 16, 2007 Trina West, A.F.N.P., prescribed David

Ragsdale two powerful steroids (Testosterone and Pregnenolone).
14.

The steroids Trina West, A.F.N.P., prescribed David Ragsdale both carry

the risk of causing psychiatric complications such as steroid-induced mania.
15.

Mr. Ragsdale was prescribed those steroids with little to no medical

inclination.
16.

Testosterone is a "Schedule III" controlled substance.

17.

Trina West, A.F.N.P., prescribed Mr. Ragsdale testosterone without

consulting Dr. Hugo Rodier, M.D., or any other medical doctor.
18.

On or about May 2, 2007 Trina West, A.F.N.P., increased Mr. Ragsdale's

doses of Testosterone and Pregnenolone.
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19.

Trina West, A.F.N.P., increased Mr. Ragsdale's doses of the steroids

without consulting Hugo Rodier M.D., or any other medical doctor.
20.

On or about July 9, 2007 Mr. Ragsdale had a follow up visit at the clinic.

21.

During that visit, Mr. Ragsdale was prescribed Concerta a "Schedule II"

controlled substance by Trina West, A.F.N.P.
22.

Concerta is the brand name for the psychostimulant drug methylphenidate.

23.

Methylphenidate carries many of the same risks associated with

methamphetamine.
24.

Trina West, A.F.N.P., prescribed David Ragsdale Concerta without

consulting Hugo Rodier, M.D., or any other medical doctor.
25.

Trina West, A.F.N.P., diagnosed David Ragsdale with Attention Deficit

Disorder (AD/HD), to justify the prescription for Concerta.
26.

On or about September 5, 2007, Trina West, A.F.N.P., doubled David

Ragsdale's doses of Concerta from 36 mg to 72 mg per day.
27.

Trina West, A.F.N.P., doubled David Ragsdale's dose of Concerta without

consulting Hugo Rodier, M.D., or any other medical doctor.
28.

On or before December 21, 2007, David Ragsdale represented to Trina

West, A.F.N.P. that he was having marital problems and that a restraining order had been
entered against him by his wife, Kristy Ragsdale.
29.

On or before December 21, 2007, David Ragsdale was displaying toxic

side effects from the combination of his prescribed medications.
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30.

After a visit on or about December 21, 2007, and after several other visits

at Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic, David Ragsdale was being prescribed the
following combination of psychotropic medications by Trina West, A.F.N .P.:
•

The psychostimulant Concerta at 54 mg daily

•

The tranquilizer Valium at 5 mg daily

•

The antidepressant Doxepin at 100 mg daily

•

The antidepressant Paxil at 40 mg daily

•

The steroid Pregnenolone at 600 mg daily

•

The hair-loss medication Propecia at 1 mg daily

•

The steroid Testosterone at 200 mg weekly by intramuscular injection
31.

On January 6, 2008, David Ragsdale shot his wife, Kristy Ragsdale (the

mother of plaintiffs B.R. and C.R.), thirteen times in a church parking lot, in broad
daylight, in front of several witnesses.
32.

Within two hours of the shooting, David Ragsdale turned himself in to the

33.

Blood toxicology reports taken from David Ragsdale show that he was

police.

within the prescribed ranges of all of his medications and that he had no illicit substances
in his blood stream at the time of shooting.
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COUNT 1
NEGLIGENCE OF TRINA WEST, A.F.N.P.
34.

Plaintiffs hereby reference and incorporate as if set forth herein the

allegations of paragraphs 1 through 33 and further allege as follows:
35.

Trina West, A.F.N.P., was negligent in the following, but not limited to

the following particulars:
a.

The failure of Trina West, A.F.N.P., to consult with Hugo Rodier, M.D.,

or any other medical doctor prior to prescribing David Ragsdale Testosterone and/or
Concerta.
b.

The failure of Trina West, A.F.N.P., to consult with Hugo Rodier, M.D.,

or any other medical doctor prior to increasing David Ragsdale's doses of Testosterone
and/or Concerta.
c.

The failure of Trina West, A.F.N.P., to have a consultation plan with Hugo

Rodier, M.D., or any other medical doctor prior to prescribing David Ragsdale
Testosterone and/or Concerta.
d.

The failure of Trina West, A.F.N.P., to have adequate justification for

prescribing David Ragsdale the combination of medications he was being prescribed in
the months leading up to the shooting of Kristy Ragsdale.
e.

The failure of Trina West, A.F.N.P., to discontinue David Ragsdale's

prescription regimen.
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f.

The failure of Trina West, A.F.N.P., to properly monitor, refer, and treat

David Ragsdale.
36.

The negligence of Trina West A.F.N .P. was likely to cause the conduct

toward Kristy Ragsdale that led to her shooting and death.
37.

The failures of Trina West A.F.N.P., were a direct, proximate, and

foreseeable cause of the conduct that led to the shooting, as well as death, of Kristy
Ragsdale.
38.

As a result of the negligence of Trina West, A.F.N.P., Plaintiffs have lost

the care comfort, society, and support of their parents.
39.

The Plaintiffs have suffered, and will continue to suffer, severe emotional

distress as a result of the negligence of Trina West, A.F.N.P.
COUNT 2
NEGLIGENCE OF HUGO RODIER, M.D.
40.

Plaintiffs hereby reference and incorporate as if set forth herein the

allegations of paragraphs 1 through 39 and further allege as follows:
41.

On information and belief, Hugo Rodier, M.D., was Trina West's

supervising and/or "consulting" physician at Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic.
42.

Utah Law required Tina West, A.F.N.P., to have a "consultation plan"

with a medical doctor which would allow her to then consult with a medical doctor to
prescribe schedule II and III controlled substances to David Ragsdale.
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43.

On information and belief, although Dr. Hugo Rodier, M.D., knew or

should have known Trina West, A.F.N.P. was treating David Ragsdale, and prescribing
David Ragsdale medications, no consultation plan existed between Hugo Rodier, M.D.,
and Trina West, A.F.N.P.
44.

The failure of Hugo Rodier, M.D., to follow the appropriate standard of

care also includes, but is not limited to:
a.

The failure of Hugo Rodier, M.D., to consult with Trina West, A.F.N.P.,

about David Ragsdale's treatment and prescriptions.
b.

The failure of Hugo Rodier, M.D., to properly monitor, refer, and treat

David Ragsdale.
45.

The negligence of Hugo Rodier, M.D. was likely to cause the conduct

toward Kristy Ragsdale that led to her shooting and death.
46.

The failures of Hugo Rodier, M.D., were a direct, proximate, and

foreseeable cause of the conduct that led to the shooting, as well as death, of Kristy
Ragsdale.
47.

As a result of the negligence of Hugo Rodier, M.D., Plaintiffs have lost

the care comfort, society, and support of their parents.
48.

The Plaintiffs have suffered, and will continue to suffer, severe emotional

distress as a result of the negligence of Hugo Rodier, M.D.

8

COUNT 3
NEGLIGENCE OF PIONEER COMPREHENSIVE MEDICAL CLINIC
AND JOHN DOES I - X
49.

Plaintiffs hereby reference and incorporate as if set forth herein the

allegations of paragraphs 1 through 48 and further allege as follows:
50.

The failure of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic, and John Does I -

X, by and through their agents, staff, nurses and employees, to follow the appropriate
standard of care includes, but is not limited to:
a.

The failure of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic and John Does I -

X, by and through their agents, staff, employees and nurses to properly monitor, refer,
and treat David Ragsdale.
b.

The failure of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic, by and through its

agents, staff, employees and nurses to ensure that Trina West, A.F.N.P., was not
exceeding her ability and authority to prescribe David Ragsdale medications.
c.

The failure of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic, by and through its

agents, staff, employees and nurses to ensure that Trina West, A.F.N.P., and Hugo
Rodier, M.D., had a proper consultation plan.
51.

The negligence of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic and John Does I

- X was likely to cause the conduct toward Kristy Ragsdale that led to her shooting and
death.

9

52.

The failures of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic were a direct,

proximate, and foreseeable cause of the conduct that led to the shooting, as well as death,
of Kristy Ragsdale.
53.

As a result of the negligence of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic,

Plaintiffs have lost the care, comfort, society, and support of their parents.
54.

The Plaintiffs have suffered, and will continue to suffer, severe emotional

distress as a result of the negligence of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic.
COUNT 4
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
55.

Plaintiffs hereby reference and incorporate as if set forth herein the

allegations of paragraphs 1 through 54 and further allege as follows:
56.

Plaintiffs claim that the acts or omissions of the defendant Trina West,

A.F.N.P., Hugo Rodier, M.D., Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic and John Does I X, were a result of willful and malicious conduct, or conduct that manifested a knowing
and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows:
1. For general and special damages in an amount to be proven at trial;
2. For interest on special damages from January 6, 2008, to the date of judgment
herein;
3. For punitive damages in an amount to be proved at trial;
4. For trial by Jury;
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5. For costs of suit incurred herein; and
6. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper in the
premises.
DATED this

z<ft\ day of April, 2010.
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO

rgysfor Plaintiffs

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff hereby demands trial by jury.
DATED this € ^ ^ 1 day of April, 2010.
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO

for Plaintiffs
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Ruling and Order, R. 391-394

uuum
Third Judicial District

l-tb 0 1 2011
**

STEPHEN W. OWENS - #6957
J. KEVIN MURPHY - #5768 (of counsel)
EPPERSON & OWENS, P.C.
10 West 100 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 983-9800
Telefax: (801) 983-9808
sowens@eolawoffice.com
kmurphv@eolawoffice.com
Attorneys for Defendant Trina West, A.F.N.P.

"

deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

B.R., a minor child, and C.R., a minor child, ])
through their Conservator WILLIAM M.
])
JEFFS,
;)
Plaintiffs,
]
v.
TRINA WEST, A.F.N.P., HUGO RODIER,
M.D., and PIONEER COMPREHENSIVE
MEDICAL CLINIC,
Defendants.

]
I
]
]1
)
]

RULING AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DISMISS

Civil No. 100907025
Judge Denise Lindberg

Defendant Trina West, A.F.N.P., joined by co-defendants Hugo Rodier, M.D., and
Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic, has moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint under Utah
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). These defendants have also moved, alternatively or additionally, for
summary judgment against plaintiffs under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(b). On December 20, 2010, oral
argument was heard on these motions, with counsel for all parties present.
Having reviewed the parties5 memoranda and heard oral argument, this Court now rules
as follows: The Court is persuaded that the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should be granted.

This is based upon the fact that no patient-health care provider relationship existed, at the time of
the underlying events, between the plaintiffs - who are the children of David and Kristy
Ragsdale - and the defendants. The patient was David Ragsdale, who is not a party to this
lawsuit. The Court is not persuaded that, under the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint, the
non-patient plaintiffs may step into David Ragsdale's shoes to pursue a malpractice lawsuit
against the defendants.
In light of its ruling on the motion to dismiss, it is not necessary to decide the defendants'
alternative motion for summary judgment. However, if this Court were to reach that alternative
motion, it would deny it. Denial would be based upon the defendants' failure to satisfy all
requirements for issue preclusion, which they assert as the basis for their alternative motion.
Specifically, issue preclusion is not satisfied because the plaintiffs in this civil case were not
parties to the previous, criminal case against David Ragsdale; nor were they in privity with any
party to that case.
For the foregoing reasons, and for the additional reasons stated from the bench on
December 20, 2010, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the motion to
dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.

-

2

-

2011.

SO ORDERED fhis^V day of J

BY THE COURT

DEMSELINDBE
District Court Judge

Approved as to form:

-

3 -

COURT'S CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that on the JQ_ day of ^QMitfj\

, 20f( , I caused to be mailed a true and

correct copy of the foregoing RULING AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO DISMISS to the following:
Tyler S. Young, Esq.
Allen K. Young, Esq.
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO
75 South 300 West
Provo,UT 84601
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Jonah Joel Orlofsky
LAW OFFICES OF JONAH ORLOFSKY
122 S. Michigan Avenue, Suite 1850
Chicago, IL 60603-6140
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Vaun B. Hall, Esq.
CAMPBELL CAMPBELL & FERENCE
1245 E. Brickyard Rd., #505
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Attorneys for Hugo Rodier, M.D.
Michael K. McKell
MCKELL CHRISTIANSEN
642 East Kirby Lane, Suite 104
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660
Attorneys for Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic
Stephen W. Owens
J. Kevin Murphy
EPPERSON & OWENS, P.C.
10 West 100 South, #500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorneys for Trina West, AFNP

<^^vUuu
G:\SWO Files\Ragsdale v. West\MSJ - MTD ORDER.doc
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APPENDIX 4
State v. Ragsdale, Criminal docket R. 63-78

4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH vs

DAVID RAGSDALE

CASE NUMBER 081400235 State Felony

CHARGES
Charge 1
76-5-202 - AGGRAVATED MURDER Capital (amended) to
1st Degree Felony
Offense Date January 06, 2008
Plea November 26, 2008 Guilty
Disposition November 26, 2008 Guilty
Charge 2 - 76-5-109 1 - DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN PRESENCE OF CHILD
3rd Degree Felony
Offense Date January 06, 2008
Plea June 02, 2008 Not Guilty
Disposition November 26, 2008 Dismissed
Charge 3 - 76-5-109 1 - DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN PRESENCE OF CHILD
3rd Degree Felony
Offense Date January 06, 2008
Plea June 02, 2008 Not Guilty
Disposition November 26, 2008 Dismissed

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
Division 3
PARTIES
Defendant - DAVID RAGSDALE
Represented by DEFENDER PUBLIC
Plaintiff -

STATE OF UTAH

DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Defendant Name DAVID RAGSDALE
Date of Birth October 28, 1972
Law Enforcement Agency LEHI POLICE
Prosecuting Agency UTAH COUNTY
This case involves domestic violence
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE

Amount Due
Amount Paid

196 00
196 00

wv,ancTP -ntrnnrts ?ov/casesearcli/CaseSeaich?action=caseHist

5/21/2010

Printed: 05/21/10 09:37:27
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CASE NUMBER 081400235 State Felony

Credit:
Balance:

0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL

TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY
Amount Due
10.00
Amount Paid
10.00
Amount Credit
0.00
Balance
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: POSTAGE- COPIES
Amount Due
3.00
Amount Paid
3.00
0.00
Amount Credit
0.00
Balance
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY
Amount Due
10.00
Amount Paid
10.00
0.00
Amount Credit
Balance
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due
Amount Paid
Amount Credit
Balance

1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: REPORTER FEES
Amount Due
25.00
Amount Paid
25.00
Amount Credit•
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

0.50
0.50
0 .00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: SPECIAL SEARCHES
11.25
Amount Due:
11.25
Amount Paid:
0.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:

Printed: 05/21/10 09:37:27

85.75
85.75

Page 2
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CASE NUMBER 081400235 State Felony

Amount Credit:
Balance:

0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY
Amount Due
20.00
Amount Paid
20.00
Amount Credit
0.00
Balance
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: POSTAGE-COPIES
Amount Due:
3.00
Amount Paid:
3.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY
Amount Due
20.00
Amount Paid
20.00
Amount Credit
0.00
Balance
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: POSTAGE-COPIES
Amount Due:
6.50
Amount Paid:
6.50
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
PROCEEDINGS
01-11-08 Filed: Motion to Continue
Filed by: STATE OF UTAH,
01-28-08 Case filed
01-28-08 Filed: From an Information
01-28-08 Judge CLAUDIA LAYCOCK assigned.
01-28-08 Filed: Bail M.E.: Court Finds Probable Cause: No Bail:
FFA-1/28/08 8:30 a.m.
01-28-08 Filed order: Media Request
Judge CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
Signed January 25, 2 00 8
01-28-08 Filed: Affidavit: No Warrant Arrest and Detention
01-28-08 INITIAL APPEARANCE scheduled on January 28, 2008 at 08:30 AM in
Second Floor, Rm 2 01 with Judge LAYCOCK.
01-28-08 Minute Entry - Minutes for Initial Appearance
Judge:
CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
PRESENT
Clerk:
joyc
Prosecutor: STURGILL, DAVID S
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): GREGORY G SKORDAS
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Audio
Tape Number:

0 8-201 3

Tape Count: 8:36

INITIAL APPEARANCE
A copy of the Information is given to the defendant.
Defendant waives reading of Information.
Advised of charges and penalties.
The defendant appears in custody of Utah County Sheriff.
WAIVE PRELIM HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 02/06/2008
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: Second Floor, Rm 201
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
125 N 100 W
PROVO, UT 84 601
Before Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
01-28-08 WAIVE PRELIM HEARING scheduled on February 06, 2008 at 01:30 PM
in Second Floor, Rm 201 with Judge LAYCOCK.
01-28-08 Charge 1 amended to 1st Degree Felony
01-31-08 Filed: Request for Discovery
01-31-08 Filed: Appearance of Counsel
02-06-08 Filed order: Media Request for Still Photography in Courtroom
Judge CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
Signed February 06, 2 00 8
02-06-08 Minute Entry - WAIVE PRELIM HEARING continued
Judge:
CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
PRESENT
Clerk:
raelenec
Prosecutor: STURGILL, DAVID S
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): GREGORY G SKORDAS
Audio
Tape Number:

0 8-201 3

Tape Count: 2.16

CONTINUANCE
The Stipulation of counsel has made a motion for continuance of
Waive Prelim Hearing.
The motion is granted.
Reason for continuance:
Counsel's request.
WAIVE PRELIM HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 03/05/2008
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: Second Floor, Rm 201
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
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125 N 100 W
PROVO, UT 84601
Before Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
02-06-08 WAIVE PRELIM HEARING Continued.
02-06-08 WAIVE PRELIM HEARING scheduled on March 05, 2008 at 01:30 PM in
Second Floor, Rm 2 01 with Judge LAYCOCK.
03-05-08 Minute Entry - WAIVE PRELIM HEARING continued
Judge:
CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
PRESENT
Clerk:
kristinw
Prosecutor: JOHNSON, CRAIG R
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): SKORDAS, GREGORY G
Audio
Tape Number:

08-06-201

Tape Count: 1:57

CONTINUANCE
The Stipulation of counsel has made a motion for continuance of
Waive Prelim Hearing.
The motion is granted.
Reason for continuance:
Pending evaluation.
The defendant appears in custody of the Utah County Sheriff.
WAIVE PRELIM HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 04/09/2008
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: Second Floor, Rm 2 01
x
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
125 N 100 W
PROVO, UT 84601
Before Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
03-05-08 WAIVE PRELIM HEARING Continued.
03-05-08 WAIVE PRELIM HEARING scheduled on April 09, 2008 at 01:30 PM in
Second Floor, Rm 2 01 with Judge LAYCOCK.
04-09-08 Minute Entry - Minutes for Waive Prelim Hearing
Judge:
CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
PRESENT
Clerk:
joyc
Prosecutor: STURGILL, DAVID S

Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): SKORDAS, GREGORY G
Audio
Tape Number:

08-201 12

Tape Count: 2:03

HEARING
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This matter comes before the Court for Waiver Hearing. The
defendant appears in custody of Utah County Sheriff.
One-half day Preliminary Hearing is requested on this matter.
Mr. Sturgill addresses an issue of a No-Contact Order be granted
between the Ragsdale family and the victim's mother.
The Court instructs the State to file a Motion with an Affidavit
and an Order in support of such request.
Preliminary Hearing is scheduled on this matter.
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 05/12/2008
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: Second Floor, Rm 201
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
125 N 100 W
PROVO, UT
84601
Before Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
04-09-08 PRELIMINARY HEARING scheduled on May 12, 2008 at 08:30 AM in
Second Floor, Rm 201 with Judge LAYCOCK.
05-07-08 Filed order: Media Request for Still Photography in
Courtroom/The Deseret Morning News (approved)
Judge CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
Signed May 07, 2008
05-09-08 PRELIMINARY HEARING Modified.
Reason: Counsel stipulated.
05-09-08 SCHEDULING CONF scheduled on May 12, 2 00 8 at 08:30 AM in Second
Floor, Rm 2 01 with Judge LAYCOCK.
05-12-08 Minute Entry - Minutes for SCHEDULING CONFERENCE
Judge:
DAVID MORTENSEN
PRESENT
Clerk:
raelenec
Prosecutor: JOHNSON, CRAIG R
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): SKORDAS, GREGORY G
Audio
Tape Number:

08-2 01 15

Tape Count: 9.04

HEARING
TAPE: 08-201 15
COUNT: 9.04
This matter comes before the Court for Scheduling Conference.
parties have stipulated to continue the Preliminary Hearing
regarding this matter.
The defendant appears in custody of the Utah County Sheriff.
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 05/27/2008
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: Second Floor, Rm 2 01
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
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125 N 100 W
PROVO, UT 84601
Before Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
05-12-08 PRELIMINARY HEARING scheduled on May 27, 2008 at 08:30 AM in
Second Floor, Rm 201 with Judge LAYCOCK.
05-22-08 Notice - NOTICE for Case 081400235 ID 9881618
Nothing to Report
05-22-08 Minute Entry - Minutes for TELEPHONE CONFERENCE
Judge:
CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
PRESENT
Clerk:
raelenec
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE
Prosecutor: JOHNSON, CRAIG R
Defendant not present
Defendant's Attorney(s): SKORDAS, GREGORY G

Audio
CONTINUANCE
The Stipulation of counsel has made a motion for continuance of
Preliminary Hearing.
The motion is granted.
Reason for continuance:
Conflict in attorney schedule
HEARING
This matter comes before the Court for a telephone conference.
The parties stipulate with the Court to continue the preliminary
hearing due to a conflict in Mr. Skordas's schedule.
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 06/02/2008
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: Second Floor, Rm 201
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
125 N 100 W
PROVO, UT 84601
Before Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
PRELIMINARY HEARING.
Date: 06/02/2008
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: Second Floor, Rm 201
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
125 N 100 W
PROVO, UT 84601
before Judge CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
05-22-08 PRELIMINARY HEARING Continued.
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05-22-08 PRELIMINARY HEARING scheduled on June 02, 2008 at 01:30 PM in
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Second Floor, Rm 2 01 with Judge LAYCOCK.
05-22-08 Notice - NOTICE for Case 081400235 ID 9881619
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled.
Date:
Date 06/02/2008
Time 01:30 p.m.
Location: Second Floor, Rm 201
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
125 N 100 W
PROVO, UT 84 601
before Judge CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
05-2 9-08 Filed return: Subpoena (Robert Wigginton)
Party Served Robert Wigginton
Service Type Personal
Service Date May 22, 2008
05-29-08 Filed return: Subpoena (Scott Wiggins)
Party Served: Scott Wiggins
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: May 22, 2008
05-2 9-08 Filed return: Subpoena (David Peterson)
Party Served: David Peterson
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: May 22, 2008
06-02-08 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE
Judge:
CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
PRESENT
Clerk:
joyc
Reporter: EATON, JEFFERY
Prosecutor: JOHNSON, CRAIG R
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): SKORDAS, GREGORY G
Audio
Tape Number:

OFF

HEARING
TAPE: OFF This matter comes before the Court for Preliminary
Hearing. The defendant appears in custody of Utah County Sheriff.
State calls Ann Palizzi, mother of Kristy Ragsdale. Ms. Palizzi
is sworn and testifies on direct by Mr. Johnson. Exhibit la, Map
of Parking Lot, is offered, marked and identified. Questioning
continued.
Mr. Skordas cross-examines the witness.
Follow up by Mr. Johnson. Witness sketches small version of
parking lot [Exhibit 1(a)] and marks where the defendant and the
victim were both standing at the time of the shooting. Sketch of
Marking Lot is identified and marked as Exhibit 1(b).
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Witness excused.
Exclusionary Rule is invoked for before and after all testimony

stated by the witnesses.
Robert Aaron Wigginton is sworn and testifies on direct by David
Sturgill. Witness indicates on Exhibit la direction he was driving
into Church lot.
Witness is cross-examined by Mr. Skordas.
Witness is excused.
Officer Jeffrey Alan Fewkes is sworn and testifies on direct by
Mr. Johnson. Followed with cross by Mr. Skordas.
Witness is excused.
Michael Stillwell is sworn and testifies on direct by Mr.
Sturgill. Exhibit lc is offered, marked and received. Questioning
continues by Mr. Sturgill. Cross by Mr. Skordas. Witness excused.
John Scott Wiggins is sworn and testifies on direct by Mr.
Sturgill. Mr. Wiggins indicates on Exhibit 1(a) how he entered an
approached the parking lot on the day of the offense. Questioning
ensues.
Cross examination by Mr. Skordas. (Exhibit 1(d), Lehi P.D.
Witness Statement, with attachment of a sketch of the crime scene,
is offered, marked and received. Witness is excused.
COUNT: 3:46
Court recesses.
COUNT: 3:59
Court resumes with all parties present and ready to proceed.
Kevin Peterson is sworn and testifies on direct by Mr. Sturgill.
Mr. Peterson indicates on Exhibit 1(a) what he had observed when he
entered the Church parking lot. Exhibit 1(e), Mr. Peterson's
scratch note of license plate # he had witnessed seeing the
scene, is offered, marked, identified and received.
Questioning continues followed by cross by Mr. Skordas.
Witness excused.
Officer Mark Birch is sworn and testifies on direct by Mr.
Johnson. Exhibit 2 is offered, marked and received, Photograph of
deceased. State's Exhibits 3, 4 and 5 are offered, marked and
identified, all still pictures taken after the body was removed.
These are still photographs taken by fire engine ladder of the
church parking lot indicating location of vehicles.
Exhibit 6 is offered, marked and identified, photograph of one of
the prior witnesses parked vehicle. Exhibit 11 is offered, marked,
identified and received: schematic of church lot created by this
witness showing bullet fragments, casings, etc.
Exhibit #9 is offered, marked, identified and received re:
photograph of weapon found in defendant's vehicle. Exhibit 10 is
offered, marked, identified and received re: medical report
prepared by Dr. Deeters, Medical Examiner.
Witness identifies the defendant. Cross by Mr. Skordas.
Witness excused.
Officer Toby Petersen, Lehi P.D., is sworn and testifies on
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direct by Mr. Sturgill.
State rests.
Defense does not intend to put on any evidence today.
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Mr. Skordas
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ii

confers with his client re: the decision made by the defense.
Real focus today is the aggravating factor. Counsel is to focus
on the aggravating factor in closing arguments. Mr. Sturgill
addresses the Court with closing arguments. Mr. Skordas addresses
the Court with closing arguments.
The Court finds the offense took place in Utah County, the
defendant has been identified, the victim is deceased, the
defendant caused the victim's death, the aggravating factor has
been met as to the Wigginton family and the victim's mother, the
defendant was aware people were coming and going at the Church,
the State has carried its burden as to Count 1, the matter took
place in the presence of chiLdren, the defendant was co-habitant
with the victim, probable cause is found as to Counts 2 and
and 3, likelihood of death as to surrounding witnesses, probable
cause is found on all counts.
The defendant is arraigned today and enters not guilty pleas to
all counts.
Mr. Skordas addresses the Court regarding bail in this matter.
Mr. Sturgill responds. The Court finds there is substantial
evidence to support this charge. The Court upholds the bail and
the defendant is to remain in custody with no bail.
Mr. Skordas requests this matter be set for a Scheduling
Conference. The State withdraws all evidence.
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE/PTC is scheduled.
Date: 07/09/2008
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: Second Floor, Rm 201
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
125 N 100 W
PROVO, UT 84601
Before Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
06-02-08 Notice - Final Exhibit List
06-02-08 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE/PTC scheduled on July 09, 2008 at 01:30
PM in Second Floor, Rm 2 01 with Judge LAYCOCK.
06-03-08 Charge 1 Plea is Not Guilty
06-03-08 Charge 2 Plea is Not Guilty
06-03-08 Charge 3 Plea is Not Guilty
06-10-08 Fee Account created
Total Due:
10.00
06-10-08 Fee Account created
Total Due:
3.0 0
06-10-08 AUDIO TAPE COPY
Payment Received:
10.00
Note: POSTAGE-COPIES
06-10-08 POSTAGE-COPIES
Payment Received:
3.00
06-30-08 Filed: Withdrawal of Counsel
07-09-08 Filed order: Affidavit of Indigency
Judge CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
Signed July 09, 2008
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07-09-08 Minute Entry - Minutes for Pretrial Conference
Judge:
CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
PRESENT
Clerk:
raelenec

Reporter: EATON, JEFFERY
Prosecutor: STURGILL, DAVID S
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): SKORDAS, GREGORY G
Audio
Tape Number:

08-201 23

HEARING
TAPE: 08-201 23 This matter comes before the Court for Pretrial
Conference. The defendant appears in custody of the Utah County
Sheriff.
Mr. Skordas addresses the Court regarding withdrawal as counsel;
granted. Affidavit of Indigency is submitted to the Court and
Public Defender is appointed.
Mr. Ragsdale is ordered to notify his sister to provide all
material given to her by Mr. Skordas be given to Public Defender's
Office by 12:00 p.m. 07/10/08.
Utah County Jail is ordered to allow the defendant to call his
sister as soon as possible regarding the return of all documents to
the Public Defender's Office.
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE.
Date: 08/06/2008
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: Second Floor, Rm 201
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
125 N 100 W
PROVO, UT 84 601
Before Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
07-09-08 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on August 06, 2008 at 01:30 PM in
Second Floor, Rm 201 with Judge LAYCOCK.
07-10-08 Fee Account created
Total Due:
10.00
07-10-08 Fee Account created
Total Due:
1.00
07-10-08 AUDIO TAPE COPY
Payment Received:
10.00
07-10-08 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
1.00
07-10-08 Note: Received CD audio request form.
07-10-08 Note: Received request for transcript form.
07-10-08 Filed: Transcript request form for Preliminary Hearing
06-02-08; requested by William M. Jeffs of Jeffs & Jeffs.
07-14-08 Filed: Request for Discovery
07-14-08 Filed: Motion for Production and Preservation of Physical
Evidence
Filed by: CURTIS R HUSSEY BUSINESS ACCOU,
07-14-08 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion for Production and

Printed: 05/21/10 09:37:30

Page 11

CASE NUMBER 081400235 State Felony

Preservation of Physical Evidence
07-16-08 Filed: Notice of Appearance of Counsel
07-17-08 Filed: Transcript request form for Preliminary Hearing
06-02-08; requested by Michelle Nelson of UCPD Association.
07-18-08 STATUS HEARING scheduled on July 23, 2 008 at 01:30 PM in Second
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Floor, Rm 201 with Judge LAYCOCK.
07-18-08 Filed: Stipulation
07-23-08 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on October 01, 2008 at 01:30 PM
in Second Floor, Rm 2 01 with Judge LAYCOCK.
07-23-08 Minute Entry - Minutes for STATUS HEARING
Judge:
CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
PRESENT
Clerk:
raelenec
Reporter: SOUTHWICK, COLLEEN
Prosecutor: JOHNSON, CRAIG R
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): HILL, DEBORAH A
Audio
Tape Number:

08-201 29

HEARING
TAPE: 08-201 29 This matter comes before the Court for Status
Hearing. The defendant appears in custody of the Utah County
Sheriff.
Counsel stipulates to extend time period in which the State must
give notice of intent to seek the death penalty to September 30,
2008.
Hearing scheduled for 08/06/08 is stricken.
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 10/01/2008
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: Second Floor, Rm 201
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
125 N 100 W
PROVO, UT 84601
Before Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
07-23-08 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE Cancelled.
Reason: Counsel stipulated.
07-30-08 Note: Hearing date of 6-2-08 Preliminary Hearing before Judge
Laycock
07-30-08 Fee Account created
Total Due:
25.00
07-30-08 REPORTER FEES
Payment Received:
2 5.00
Note: REPORTER FEES
08-15-08 Filed return: Subpoena Duces Tecum
Party Served Pioneer Comprehensive Medical
Service Type Personal
Service Date August 14, 200 8
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09-17-08 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE Cancelled.
Reason: Counsel stipulated.
09-17-08 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE rescheduled on September 24, 2008 at 01:30
PM
Reason:.
09-24-08 STATUS CONFERENCE scheduled on November 26, 2008 at 01:30 PM in
Second Floor, Rm 2 01 with Judge LAYCOCK.

09-24-08 Minute Entry - Minutes for Pretrial Conference
Judge:
CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
PRESENT
Clerk:
raelenec
Reporter: SOUTHWICK, COLLEEN
Prosecutor: STURGILL, DAVID S
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): HOWELL, ANTHONY L
Audio
Tape Number:

08-201 37

HEARING
TAPE: 08-201 37 This matter comes before the Court for Pretrial
Conference. The defendant appears in custody of the Utah County
Sheriff.
Mr. Howell addresses the Court regarding Stipulation agreed upon
by both parties. Mr. Howell is to prepare an Order in this matter
regarding stipulation.
Status Conference is scheduled.
STATUS CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 11/26/2008
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: Second Floor, Rm 201
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
125 N 100 W
PROVO, UT 84 601
Before Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
09-24-08 Filed: Stipulation
09-26-08 Fee Account created
Total Due:
0.50
09-26-08 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
0.5 0
Note: 1.00 cash tendered.
0.5 change given.
10-10-08 Filed order: Order
Judge CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
Signed October 10, 2008
10-14-08 Filed: Original Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, June 2, 2 008
by Jeff S. Eaton
11-26-08 SENTENCING scheduled on January 29, 2009 at 01:30 PM in Second
Floor, Rm 201 with Judge LAYCOCK.
11-26-08 Minute Entry - Minutes for SCHEDULING CONFERENCE
Judge:
CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
PRESENT
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Clerk:
raelenec
Prosecutor: STURGILL, DAVID S
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): KAWAI, RUSSEL-PAUL H
Audio
Tape Number:

08-201 48

Tape Count: 1.42

HEARING
TAPE: 08-201 48
COUNT: 1.42
This matter comes before the Court for Scheduling Conference. The
defendant appears in custody of the Utah County Sheriff.
Mr. Kawai addresses the Court stating the parties have reached an
agreement. The defendant will plead guilty to Count 1 as charged
and Counts 2 and 3 are dismissed.
Information is amended by interlineation. Statement by defendant
is received and accepted by the Court after factual basis is given.
Defendant waives time for sentencing.
Adult Probation and Parole is to meet with the defendant at the
Utah County Jail for preparation of the PSI Report.
Sentencing is scheduled.
SENTENCING is scheduled.
Date: 01/29/2009
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: Second Floor, Rm 201
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
125 N 100 W
PROVO, UT 84 601
Before Judge: CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
11-26-08 Filed order: Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea
and Certificate of Counsel
Judge CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
Signed November 26, 2 00 8
11-26-08 Charge 1 Disposition is Guilty
11-26-08 Charge 2 Disposition is Dismissed
11-26-08 Charge 3 Disposition is Dismissed
01-22-09 Filed order: Media Request for Still Photography in the
Courtroom (granted)
Judge CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
Signed January 22, 2 0 09
01-29-09 SENTENCING rescheduled on January 30, 2009 at 10:30 AM
Reason: Counsel stipulated..
01-30-09 Minute Entry - Minutes for SENTENCING
Judge:
CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
PRESENT
Clerk:
joyc
Reporter: SOUTHWICK, COLLEEN
Prosecutor: STURGILL, DAVID S
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Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): KAWAI, RUSSEL-PAUL H
Audio
Tape Number:
HEARING

09-201 4

Tape Count: 11:07

TAPE: 09-201 4
COUNT: 10:45
This matter comes before the Court for Sentencing. Discussions,
on the record, take place between the Court and counsel being
conducted in chambers.
COUNT: 11:07
Discussions conclude in chambers.
COUNT: 11:22
Court resumes in session. Defendant appears in custody of Utah
County Sheriff. The Court summarizes discussions in chambers. The
Pre-Sentence report has been amended. Amended Report will be sent
to the Board of Pardons.
The Court states in open court the agreement between the parties,
however, strongly indicates the ultimate time the defendant will
spend in prison will be upon the decision of the Board of Pardons.
Mr. Kawai addresses the Court, speaking on behalf of Mr. Howell
and Ms. Hill, stressing the remorse their client has been feeling.
Mr. Ragsdale addresses the Court reading a statement prepared by
himself, followed by a statement prepared by the Ragsdale family
read by Mr. Kawai.
Mrs. Ann Palizzi addresses the Court stating a lengthy description
regarding her daughter. Ms. Palizzi concludes with thanking the
community and many others for their support throughout this
tragedy.
Jamie and Aaron Wignington address the Court stating the effect
the crime has affected their family.
Terri Hunter and Samantha Hollister address the Court reiterating
the effects their families have inflicted due to the crime, with
final comments stated by Matt Soren.
Sentencing is imposed. The Court reserves jurisdiction over
restitution for 60 days regarding the Wigington family.
Restitution for the Kristy Ragsdale Estate and Children was
resolved through a civil lawsuit.
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED MURDER a 1st
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than twenty years and which may be life in the Utah
State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.

Printed: 05/21/10 09:37:31

Page 15

CASE NUMBER 0 814 00235 State Felony

To the UTAH County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
The Court recommends to the Board of Pardons the defendant receive
3 89 days credit for time served. In addition Court recommends
defendant participate in mental health therapy while incarcerated

at the prison.
SENTENCE FINE SUSPENDED NOTE
The Court suspends all fines and fees.
**** PRIVATE **** Filed: Adult Probation & Parole/PSI Report
Fee Account created
Total Due:
11.25
Fee Account created
Total Due:
85.75
SPECIAL SEARCHES
Payment Received:
11.25
COPY FEE
Payment Received:
8 5.75
Fee Account created
Total Due:
20.00
Fee Account created
Total Due:
3.00
AUDIO TAPE COPY
Payment Received:
20.00
Note: POSTAGE-COPIES, Mail Payment;
04-27-10 POSTAGE-COPIES
Payment Received:
3.00
05-05-10 Fee Account created
Total Due:
20.00
05-05-10 Fee Account created
Total Due:
6.50
05-05-10 AUDIO TAPE COPY
Payment Received:
2 0.00
Note: POSTAGE-COPIES, Mail Payment;
05-05-10 POSTAGE-COPIES
Payment Received:
6.50
05-10-10 Filed: Request for Copy of Audio Record (11/26/08 & 1/30/09
mailed to Epperson & Owens)
05-10-10 Filed: Request for Copy of Audio Record (3/5/08 hearing mailed
to Epperson & Owens)
01-30-09
01-07-10
01-07-10
01-07-10
01-07-10
04-27-10
04-27-10
04-27-10
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APPENDIX 5
State v. Ragsdale, Criminal Plea Hearing, R. 127-153

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
VS.

CASE NO. 081400235

DAVID RAGSDALE
Defendant.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE CLAUDIA LAYCOCK

FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
125 NORTH 100 WEST
PROVO, UTAH

84601

PLEA BARGAIN HEARING
ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED ON
NOVEMBER 26, 2008

Reported by:

Colleen C. Southwick, RPR/CSR

©PY

EXHIBIT
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

1 3\o-i

2

A P P E A R A N C E S

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
DAVID STURGILL
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center #2100
Provo, Utah 84606

FOR THE DEFENDANT:
RUSTY KAWAI
Utah County Public Defenders
245 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 846 01
P R O C E E D I N G S
MR. KAWAI:

Your Honor, No. 25 on the calendar is

David Ragsdale.
THE COURT:
matter.

All right.

We'll call the Ragsdale

We have our court reporter?

Very good.

Mr. Kawai, we're ready to go forward?

All right.
It's my

understanding from having met with the attorneys this morning
that a plea agreement has been reached and that Mr. Ragsdale is
going to enter his plea today.
Is that correct, Mr . Kawai?
MR. KAWAI:

That 's (correct.

THE COURT:

And let me first have the State put on

the record what the agreement is and inform me as to any
amendments I need tc> make to the Information.
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MR. STURGILL:

Yes, my understanding is that Mr.

Ragsdale is going to plead to Count 1 as charged, aggravated
murder, and in exchange with respect to the Information, the
State would then make a motion to dismiss Counts 2 and 3, both
counts are third-degree felonies, domestic violence in the
presence of child.
THE COURT:

All right.

Is that your understanding as

MR. KAWAI:

It is, Judge.

THE COURT:

All right.

well?

will dismiss Counts 2 and 3.

With that, upon his plea I

This obviously takes care of the

capital portion.
MR. STURGILL:
THE COURT:

It does, Judge.

And the State is giving up its right to

move forward as a capital felony.

All right.

Mr. Kawai, before I begin going through the
defendant's rights with him, would you put on the record for me
what efforts have been made by your office with regard to
representing Mr. Ragsdale in this matter and speaking with him
about this plea agreement.
MR. KAWAI:

Yes, your Honor.

As the Court is aware,

when Mr. Ragsdale was assigned to our office, we assigned three
attorneys; myself, Andy Howell and Debbie Hill as his
attorneys.

Debbie Hill was the chief lead attorney in this

case.
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THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. KAWAI:

We also retained a mitigation expert who

has been doing mitigation research into the Ragsdale matter.
Also, a psychologist and a factual expert as well -THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. KAWAI:

-- has been doing some factual --

THE COURT:

Investigation.

MR. KAWAI:

Investigation.

THE COURT:

All right.

Would you get the microphone

a little bit closer to your mouth.
MR. KAWAI:

Sure.

THE COURT:

All right.

MR. KAWAI:

About two months ago Mr. Ragsdale and I

talked about -- he's had a desire to resolve this case for
several months now.

We have in our mind what that resolution,

the right resolution should be.

We are a bit off with the

prosecutors and there's been some back and forth with us and
the prosecutors and trying to weigh the desires of the victims
in this case, namely Ann Palizzi and Al Palizzi.

Those are

Kristy's parents.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. KAWAI:

And last Friday I received a call from

Mr. Johnson, one of the prosecutors in this case, giving me
their counteroffer.

Friday morning I met with David and with

the team, with Andy Howell and Debbie Hill.
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We came to the

1

conclusion that it was the right thing to do.

2

Ragsdale asked me if we could get some other opinions on this

3

matter.

4

call into Ron Yangich.

5

about the ins and outs of this plea and he was in agreement

6

that this was the right thing to do for David.

7

At that time Mr.

We all highly value Ron Yangich's opinion.

I made a

Ron was gracious enough to talk to me

Sunday at 2:30 Lieutenant Carter at the jail arranged

8

for the Ragsdale family to come meet with David through the

9

glass and the legal team, and that was an emotional meeting

10

with all the family members.

11

this plea with Ted Ragsdale, Judy Ragsdale, which are David's

12

parents, Christy Ragsdale was present, David's sister, Steve

13

Labrum, David's cousin, was present, John Ragsdale was present

14

and so was Tamara Ragsdale.

15

and cons of the plea and came out with positive feelings about

16

this plea as well.

17

We discussed the ins and outs of

We discussed at length the pros

Monday morning Deputy Hill and I met again with David

18

Ragsdale on a contact visit.

We brought with us Don Blanchard

19

who is retired from the State.

Don served for a number of

20

years on the Board of Pardons.

The purpose of that meeting

21

with Mr. Blanchard was to basically tell Dave what he could

22

expect in prison, the prison life that David would be looking

23

at.

24

influence his decision.

25

Pardons will treat your case.

There were no guarantees made by Mr. Blanchard to David to
It was simply this is how the Board of
This is what will likely happen
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to you when you get put into the prison.

You'll go into R and

0, you'll go through indoctrination, you'll be put in maximum
confinement for a period of time and then you can work into
general population.
THE COURT:

That was the nature of that meeting.
Were any promises made to him at all with

regard to an outcome with the Board of Pardons or anything else
like that?
MR. KAWAI:

Absolutely not.

THE COURT:

You understand that, Mr. Ragsdale?

THE DEFENDANT:

I do, your Honor.

THE COURT:

All right.

MR. KAWAI:

And I think it was really Friday that

David and I talked about this plea and we were feeling that
this was the way we wanted to go.

Obviously Mr. Yangich's

opinions on this weighed heavily as well.

Mr. Yangich agreed

to accept a call from David yesterday at the noon hour and he
personally went over the plea agreement as proposed by the
State and we've come to the conclusion that this was the right
way to go for, not just the Ragsdale family, not just for David
Ragsdale, but for Ann and Al Palizzi and Brandon and Carter
Ragsdale.

So this is what we want to do.
THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Ragsdale, is everything

that Mr. Kawai just explained to me the truth as you understand
it?
THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, your Honor.
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THE COURT:

And you understand any discussions you

had with Mr. Yangich or any discussions you had with
Mr. Blanchard or with your attorneys, that no one can predict
what the Board of Pardons will do when they have all the facts
before them with regard to how long you stay at the prison?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Any more questions that you want to ask

your attorney about anything that we've discussed so far?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Not at this time, your Honor.

All right.

Let me have the State tell me

any further agreements with regard to the plea agreement and
then also whether or not the victim's families and in the case
of the father and the sons, the victims, are on board with
this?
MR. STURGILL:

Judge in addition to the defendant

pleading guilty to Count 1, we've also reached an agreement
with respect to sentencing.

Excuse me.

The joint agreement is

that we would be recommending that the defendant be sentenced
to 20 years to life, that is life with parole.
THE COURT:

All right.

Then talk to me about your

discussions with the victims.
MR. STURGILL:

With respect to our discussion with

the victims, Judge, last week Mr. Johnson and I had contacted
the Palizzi family.

We explained the agreement that we were

intending to propose or extend to the defense.

Ms. Palizzi
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wanted some time to talk it over with her family which she did.
She got back to us, I believe, late last week and told us that
she agreed with the plea bargain and gave us the green light.
Just last night I met with the Wigington family.

If

you'll recall, Judge, the Wigingtons, it was Mr. Wigington and
his two sons that were walking into church when this occurred.
I met with them last night.
plea bargain.

I explained to them the proposed

They are comfortable with the plea bargain and

in agreement with this resolution.
trial.

We discussed going to

We discussed the possibilities had we gone that course.

We've also discussed the possibilities with this plea bargain
and I feel like they -- that they are well aware of what's
going on today and they have consented to this plea bargain.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. STURGILL:

Thank you.

Your Honor, Ms. Wigington is actually

present in the courtroom today and I spoke to her just a moment
ago.

Last night there was some trepidation.

This afternoon

she feels better.
THE COURT:

Okay.

I would also indicate for the

benefit of the record that the parties have met with me and
have explained the plea agreement and especially the agreement
about the life with parole, for 20 years to life with parole.
MR. KAWAI:

And, Judge, I've also explained to my

client that that is life with the possibility of parole.
THE COURT:

Right.

Thank you.
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MR. KAWAI:

T h a t d o e s n ' t n e c e s s a r i l y m e a n he will

2

have p a r o l e .

3

time a n d he is aware of t h a t .

4

That m e a n s that he m a y b e e l i g i b l e for it at some

T H E COURT:

All right.

T h a n k y o u for correcting

the

5

vernacular.

And I have a g r e e d to b e b o u n d b y the p a r t i e s '

6

d e c i s i o n and that's what I w i l l o r d e r at t h e time of

7

sentencing.

8

be an o p t i o n here and w e ' r e only t a l k i n g a b o u t p r i s o n for this

9

defendant.

Obviously to all of u s p r o b a t i o n

10

Y o u understand t h a t , M r .

11

T H E DEFENDANT:

12

T H E COURT:

is not going to

Ragsdale?

I do, your H o n o r .

All right.

T h e n l e t m e ask M r . K a w a i ,

13

have y o u g o n e through a statement b e f o r e p l e a d i n g g u i l t y w i t h

14

the d e f e n d a n t in this m a t t e r ?

15

M R . KAWAI:

Yes, your Honor.

I b e l i e v e that the

16

Court a n d t h e State also h a s an e x a c t c o p y of the

17

that I've g o n e over w i t h M r . R a g s d a l e .

18

p a r a g r a p h b y paragraph w i t h David.

19

that h e ' s waiving.

20

the f i n e s that can b e imposed and h e u n d e r s t a n d s that these are

21

the e l e m e n t s of the crime that are b e i n g a l l e g e d and that he's

22

a g r e e i n g that that is w h a t h a p p e n e d on t h e 6th of January,

23

2008.

24
25

statement

I w e n t over it

He u n d e r s t a n d s the rights

He u n d e r s t a n d s the m a x i m u m punishment

T H E COURT:

A l l right.

p r o b a b l y seen me do what I'm

Now, M r . Ragsdale,

about to do w i t h other

C E R T I F I E D COURT
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before.

I'm going to do much more with you because of the

nature of this crime and the nature of the penalty that you
face.
Let me ask first are you thinking clearly today?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Absolutely.

Yes, your Honor.

And we've talked at great length about

what has gone into setting up this agreement and what's gone
before this plea today.
Do you wish any additional time to talk to any of
your attorneys before we go forward today?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

No, your Honor.

Are you satisfied with your attorney's

advice?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Absolutely.

And are you satisfied with what they have

been able to do for you, not only with the plea agreement, but
with all other aspects of their representation?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Absolutely.

Now, have you read through that statement

carefully yourself paragraph by paragraph?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

I have, your Honor.

Is there any part of it that you do not

understand?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

There ' s not.

Is there any part of it that you want to
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discuss in any way at greater length with any of your

2

attorneys?

3

THE DEFENDANT:

4

THE COURT:

No, your Honor.

Let me work my way through it.

First of

5

all, you understand that you are pleading, as charged in the

6

Information in Count 1, to aggravated murder, a first-degree

7

felony?

8

THE DEFENDANT:

9

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

And you understand that the penalty for

10

that according to statute is 20 years at a minimum for which it

11

may be your lifetime.

12

Do you understand that?

13

THE DEFENDANT:

14

THE COURT:

15

there is no guarantee.

Yes, your Honor.

There is a possibility of parole, but
Do you understand that?

16

THE DEFENDANT:

17

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Do you understand that the elements here

18

are that on January 6th of 2008 in Utah County, Utah, I believe

19

the city was Lehi, right?

20

MR. KAWAI:

It was.

21

THE COURT:

Okay.

That you intentionally or

22

knowingly caused the death of another, Kristy Ragsdale, and

23

that you knowingly created a great risk of death to a person

24

other than the victim and you.

25

Do you understand that those are the elements?
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THE DEFENDANT:

2

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Okay.

Those are the elements that the

3

State would be required to prove if this matter were to go to

4

trial.

5

Do you understand that?

6

THE DEFENDANT:

7

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

All right.

And do you understand that by

8

pleading guilty today you'll be admitting that you committed

9

that crime as described by those elements?

10

THE DEFENDANT:

11

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

And you understand that in a few minutes

12

when I get to that point, I'm going to have the State, one of

13

the prosecutors, provide me with a factual basis.

14

point I'm going to ask you whether you admit that that is what

15

happened.

16

THE DEFENDANT:

17

THE COURT:

And at that

Yes, your Honor.

All right.

Now, everything we're doing

18

today is intended to make sure that you're entering this plea

19

voluntarily, that you understand what you're doing.

20

all, you understand obviously you have the right to be

21

represented by counsel and you are still represented by counsel

22

today.

23
24
25

First of

Any questions that you have with regard to that
right?
THE DEFENDANT:

No, your Honor.
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1

THE COURT:

Obviously you didn't waive your right to

2

counsel and counsel has been provided by the State in this

3

matter.

4

the advice and the help that you have received from your

5

counsel?

Once, again, let me just ask.

6

THE DEFENDANT:

7

THE COURT:

Are you satisfied with

Yes, your Honor.

You understand that what you're giving up

8

by entering this plea today is your right to a speedy and

9

public trial by an impartial jury?

10

THE DEFENDANT:

11

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

You also understand that as part of that

12

jury trial right, you give up your right to see and observe the

13

witnesses who would be testifying against you?

14

THE DEFENDANT:

15

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

And you understand also that you would

16

give up your right to have your attorneys cross-examine those

17

witnesses who would testify against you?

18

THE DEFENDANT:

19

THE COURT:

20

Do you also understand that you would be

allowed to compel witnesses to come and testify on your behalf?

21

THE DEFENDANT:

22

THE COURT:

23

Yes, your Honor.

Yes, your Honor.

And that by entering this plea today

you're going to give up that right as well?

24

THE DEFENDANT:

25

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Do you also understand that if you
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couldn't afford to subpoena those witnesses and pay for their
attendance, the State would pay for those witnesses to come?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Do you also understand that at that trial

you could testify, if you wanted to, and tell the jury your
side of the story?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

You also understand that you have a right

not to testify and you could choose not to tak€* the stand?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Do you also understand that if you chose

not to testify, the jury would be instructed that they couldn't
hold that against you?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

And knowing all of that about your right

to testify or not, do you give up those rights?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

You understand that your plea of guilty,

excuse me, your plea, your original plea of not guilty allows
you to be presumed innocent by the jury until they hear all the
facts and decide otherwise?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

And you understand by entering this plea

today you are going to give up the right to be presumed
innocent by that jury?
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT
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THE DEFENDANT:

2

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

You understand if we went to trial, that

3

the State would have the burden of proving each of those

4

elements of the crime that I described to you?

5

THE DEFENDANT:

6

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

And you understand that if there were a

7

trial, in this case I believe it would be -- well, depending on

8

how it would have gone forward, 8 or 12 jurors -- you would

9

have -- they would have been required to reach a unanimous

10

verdict in order to convict you?

11

THE DEFENDANT:

12

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

And you understand that by entering this

13

plea today you're going to give up that right to require that

14

unanimous verdict?

15

THE DEFENDANT:

16

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

You also understand that by entering this

17

plea today you're going to give up your right to appeal any

18

issues that might be before me or before an appellate court?

19

THE DEFENDANT:

20

THE COURT:

21

And knowing all of that do you want to go

forward with this plea today?

22

THE DEFENDANT:

23

MR. STURGILL:

24
25

Yes, your Honor.

Yes, your Honor.
Judge, just one thing.

Perhaps I

didn't hear, but I've been following along with the Court -THE COURT:

All right.

If I skip something catch me.
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MR. STURGILL:

I believe you skipped that the State

would have to prove each and every element beyond a reasonable
doubt.
THE COURT:

Oh, did I not say the reasonable doubt?

MR. STURGILL:
THE COURT:

I didn't hear you.

Let me just do it as a precaution.

You understand that the burden being shifted to them
or the responsibility being the State's to prove you guilty on
each element requires that they prove you guilty on each
element beyond a reasonable doubt as to each element.
Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

I do, your Honor.

All right.

And knowing that you want to

give up that right, give up placing that responsibility on them
and go forward with your plea today?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

All right.

Thank you.

Now, we've talked

a little bit about the penalties that -- the penalty that
you're facing here.

This is a statutory penalty, and part of

this plea agreement is that you will plead and the sentencing
would be the 20 years which may be for life with a possibility
of parole.
You understand all of that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

And you understand that as far as parole
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is concerned, that's not a part of my control?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

And you understand that that would be in

the hands of the Board of Pardons?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

And you understand that any discussions

you've had with your attorneys or Mr. Yangich or Mr. Blanchard,
regardless as to what they think might or might not happen,
that decision ultimately, as to how long you remain at the Utah
State Prison, will be made by the Board of Pardons?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

You also know as far as the fine is

concerned, that you're facing the possibility of a $10,000 fine
plus an 85 percent surcharge?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

And that that is in my discretion.

won't be the Board of Pardons' decision.

That

That would be in my

discretion.
Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

All right.

I don't think I need to talk

about any issues as to consecutive sentencing as you're being
only sentenced on -- or will be sentenced on only this one
single crime as the other two will be dismissed.
MR. STURGILL:

Judge, the issue of restitution.
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THE COURT:

Thank you.

There is always the

possibility of restitution in this matter.

And I may, upon

proper proof or an agreement between the parties, order that
you pay restitution in this matter.
You understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

And I•m aware that there's been

settlement in the civil case.

And I can't tell you today how

that works or what that would have to do with it.

Your

attorneys would need to give you any advice as to that, but I
just want you to understand that I have the power and the
responsibility to assess restitution if I find it's justified
by the facts.
You understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

All right.

on the record the plea agreement.

I think we've adequately put
Does either of the parties

want to say anything more about the plea agreement?
MR. STURGILL:
THE COURT:

No, your Honor.

All right.

Now, is there anything in any

of the discussions you've had with anyone, not just your
attorneys or the outside experts that you've talked to, but
also family or anyone else, friends, anyone else that makes you
feel that you are doing this today under any force or under any
coercion?
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THE DEFENDANT:

2

THE COURT:

No, your Honor.

Is there anything that's made you feel

3

that you have been threatened in any way to enter this plea

4

today?

5

THE DEFENDANT:

6

THE COURT:

No, your Honor.

Do you believe in the end that you're

7

doing this because it's the best thing for you to do at this

8

time?

9

THE DEFENDANT:

10

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

And as far as any promises, are there any

11

promises that you feel that have been made -- any time before

12

this moment that have been made that would induce you to enter

13

into this plea?

14

THE DEFENDANT:

15

THE COURT:

16

THE DEFENDANT:

17

THE COURT:

18

THE DEFENDANT:

19
20

No, your Honor.

You're 36?
I am, your Honor.

And how much schooling have you had?
I have a high school education, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

All right.

Did you have any difficulty

21

reading this statement that your attorney has right there in

22

front of you?

23

THE DEFENDANT:

24

THE COURT:

25

No, your Honor.

All right.

Were you under the influence

of any drugs or medication or other intoxicants at the time
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT
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1

that you entered the agreement or decided that you would enter

2

this plea today?

3

THE DEFENDANT:

4

T H E COURT:

N o , your Honor.

A r e y o u under the influence of any

5

medication or drugs or intoxicants n o w that would affect your

6

ability to knowingly and voluntarily go through with this plea

7

today?

8

T H E DEFENDANT:

9

THE COURT:

N o , your Honor.

D o you feel that n o t only now, but in the

10

process of talking to your attorneys and m a k i n g these decisions

11

that y o u have been mentally sound and that you've been capable

12

of making the decision that brings y o u here to m e today?

13

T H E DEFENDANT:

14

T H E COURT:

Y e s , your Honor.

D o you feel that y o u are free of any

15

mental disease or defect or impairment that would prevent you

16

from understanding what you were doing today?

17

THE DEFENDANT:

18

T H E COURT:

Y e s , your Honor.

A n d do you believe that there is anything

19

that would prevent y o u from entering a knowing and intelligent

20

and a voluntary plea in this matter today?

21

T H E DEFENDANT:

22

THE COURT:

Lastly --

23

MR. KAWAI:

Your Honor, if w e could have a quick

24
25

N o , your Honor.

clarification.
THE COURT:

Okay.

C E R T I F I E D COURT
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1

MR. KAWAI:

The Court asked if he believed that he

2

was under any impairment that would prevent him and there may

3

have been a positive response to that.

4

a paragraph.

If we can back up just

5

You're not under any medical condition at this point

6

that would affect your entering this plea today, right, David?

7

THE DEFENDANT:

8

THE COURT:

9
10

Okay.

Anything that I haven't covered in

any way that would make you feel hesitant or uncomfortable
about entering this plea today?

11

THE DEFENDANT:

12

THE COURT:

13

No.

No, your Honor.

Are there any questions you want to ask

me before we go forward with your plea?

14

THE DEFENDANT:

15

THE COURT:

Not at this time, your Honor.

Okay.

Anything else that's come up in

16

the last few minutes that you want to discuss with your

17

attorneys?

18

THE DEFENDANT:

19

T H E COURT:

No, your Honor.

T h e last thing I w a n t to let you k n o w is

20

that my u n d e r s t a n d i n g

21

Department of Corrections, the Office of Adult Probation and

22

Parole for a presentence report, and we're going to set

23

sentencing -- I think we already have a date in mind at the end

24

of January.

25

is that w e are g o i n g to refer this to the

If you believe there's good cause to withdraw the
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plea that you enter today, you must file a written motion
before I sentence you.

Otherwise, you're cut off and you would

not be able to make that motion.
Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Do you also understand that there's no

guarantee I would grant such a motion.

It's just that this is

the time period during which such a motion could be made.
Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.

MR. KAWAI:

Your Honor, if I could have a moment?

THE COURT:

Okay.

(Discussion between attorney and client.)
MR. KAWAI:

Judge, I discussed with my client the

right that he has to be sentenced within 4 5 days.

He will

waive that right so that we can go forward with sentencing on
the 2 9th.
THE COURT:

All right.

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Is that your desire?

Yes, your Honor.

And knowing that you have a right to be

sentenced in the next two to 45 days, do you give up that
right?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

I do, your Honor.

All right.

Let me ask the State, is

there anything else that you would like me to cover?
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

MR. STURGILL:

Just one thing, Judge.

I'd ask that

you incorporate by reference this written plea agreement into
your colloquy
THE COURT:

Oh, yeah, I will.

MR. STURGILL:

All right.

MR. KAWAI:

No, Judge.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Anything else, Mr. Kawai?

With that then I'm ready to take

his plea unless the parties have anything else you want me to
do.

Okay.

Let me turn to the Information, Mr. Ragsdale
To the charge contained in Count 1, aggravated

murder, in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5--202,
what is your plea?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Guilty, your Honor.

I will dismiss Counts 2 and 3 pursuant to

the agreement of the parties, and those are the only other
counts.

I accept your plea.
MR. STURGILL:
THE COURT:

I'm sorry.

MR. STURGILL:
THE COURT:

Judge, did you want to -I'm getting there.

Okay.

Just relax.

I'll take care of it.

Let

me first -- has he already signed the document?
MR. KAWAI:

No.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Let' s have him go ahead and sign

the document then.
MR. KAWAI:

I've dated it for him the 26th of
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November 2 0 08, the date today.
THE COURT:

Please.

reviewed this already.

May I approach?
As indicated earlier, I have

A copy was provided to me this morning.

I looked at it very carefully and we have on the record made
our way completely through this.

It has been signed by the

defendant in my presence just right now.
signed by Mr. Kawai.

It's already been

I'm not sure whose signature this is from

the prosecution.
MR. STURGILL:

That would be mine first, Judge, and

Mr. Johnson follows mine and the numbers are our bar numbers
are respective for each name.
THE COURT:

Oh, all right.

signed by the two prosecutors.

Thank you.

It's been

Having reviewed the document I

will sign it and date it today's date, the 26th of November.
And as always, we will make it a part of the record.

It is a

reflection and a written record of everything that we have done
on the record.

I think we've done it carefully enough.

We

actually didn't need this, but we have both.
All right.

So with that, having made the record,

having had the defendant enter his plea of guilty to Count 1,
having dismissed Counts 2 and 3, I accept the defendant's plea
of guilty to aggravated murder.
I find that the defendant understands the rights that
are described in this statement as well as the rights that we
have discussed here on the record.

I find that he understands
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the plea agreement in this matter.

I find that he understands

the penalty that he is facing with regard to time at the Utah
State Prison, and I find that he has knowingly, voluntarily,
intelligently and intentionally waived all of the rights that
we've talked about on the record and that are described in this
statement, and that he has entered his plea in such a manner.
Now, we have previously agreed that sentencing would
be on Thursday January 29th at 1:30.

Is that still a good

time?
MR. STURGILL:

That's a good date.

Judge, could we

approach?
THE COURT:

Yes.

(Off the record discussion.)
THE COURT:
on, I forgot.

Having said that I would do it earlier

I need a factual basis.

MR. STURGILL:

Judge, on January 6th, 2008, the

defendant intentionally shot and killed Kristy Ragsdale, the
defendant's wife.

The murder occurred in an LDS Church parking

lot in Lehi as Kristy walked from her car to the chapel doors.
When Mr. Ragsdale initially shot Kristy, standing behind her
several yards were Aaron Wigingtons and his two sons.

A round

actually struck the front grill of the car the Wigingtons were
standing beside and thereby knowingly created a great risk of
death to another.
THE COURT:

All right.

And those are the facts as I
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remember them from the preliminary hearing.
Do you admit that that is what happened?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
one, Counsel.

Yes, your Honor.

All right.

Thank you for catching that

And with that, I still accept the plea making

all the findings that I made before and incorporating the
statement into the record.

All right.

Anything else we need to cover that was forgotten in
the rush of doing this?

Okay.

Then I'm going to refer the

defendant to the office of Adult Probation and Parole for a
presentence report.

We will notify them that you are being

held at the Utah County Jail.

They will work with you.

I'll

encourage you to fill out the paperwork as carefully and as
accurately as possible for them in preparing a report and I
will see you next on January 29th at 1:30 in the afternoon.
Anything else, Counsel?
MR. STURGILL:
THE COURT:

No, your Honor.

Thank you.

All right.

(PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED
MATTER WERE CONCLUDED.)
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P R O C E E D I N G S
(The following proceedings were held in chambers.)
THE COURT:
chambers.

All right.

We are on the record in

It's about quarter to 11.

This is the matter of

State versus Ragsdale, our File No. 081400235.
the State David Sturgill, Craig Johnson.

I have here for

I have here for the

defense Debbie Hill, Dusty Kawai and Andy Howell.

We're

recording this both on recorder and with the court reporter.
And I have my clerk Kristin here.
So Mr. Sturgill wanted to address some things that he
feels should be corrected in the pre-sentence report.

Go

ahead.
MR. STURGILL:

Judge, I111 first reference page 4.

This may be just a matter of clarification.

The very last

paragraph before Subsection C, that paragraph tends to give the
impression that Mr. Ragsdale, upon his arrest, was questioned
by officers and readily admitted to what he'd done and
mentioned that it was due to medication.
THE COURT:

Would you read the language you're

speaking of, please, into the record?
MR. STURGILL:

I will.

It says, "He admitted his

involvement in the incident but stated he was under the
influence of medications which may have caused him to become
charged enough to commit this offense."
THE COURT:

Enraged enough.
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MR. STURGILL:

Or I'm sorry, enraged.

"Officers

questioned the defendant for several hours during the
investigation then transported Mr. Ragsdale to the Utah County
Jail where he remained incarcerated."
That gives the impression that the defendant was
questioned immediately after his arrest and admitted his
involvement.

That is untrue.

It is also possible that the

writer was simply stating that during his investigation he
admitted to his involvement and blamed the medication, but I
just want to clear that up; that when he was arrested by Lehi
City Police, he immediately invoked his right to counsel.
was not questioned by police.
hours.

He

He was detained for several

He did make some spontaneous statements unrelated to

this offense, but in no way was he questioned by police and in
no way did he admit his involvement, at least on January 6th.
THE COURT:

So how would you correctly state whatever

should be at the end of this factual summary of the offense?
MR. STURGILL:

I think that's a good suggestion.

Just redact that paragraph.
MS. HILL:

And I would agree with that, your Honor.

My memory -THE COURT:
MS. HILL:

Let's get to the microphone.
I'm sorry.

My memory of the discovery is

that Greg Skordas was hired immediately.
day.

He was hired that

David did turn himself in and voluntarily turned himself
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1

in which that paragraph right above the one the State is

2

objecting to indicates that he had counsel immediately that day

3

so he did not make statements that day.

4

THE COURT:

Should we just put at the end of the

5

previous sentence after the words and turned himself in period,

6

he thereafter invoked his right to counsel and immediately

7

retained counsel?

8

MR. STURGILL:

9

MS. HILL:

10
11

THE COURT:
change.

12

That would be fine.

That's fine, your Honor.
All right.

I'm going to make that

Hang on.
All right.

I have changed the second-to-the-last

13

paragraph of the factual summary of the offense on page 4.

14

the end of the second-to-the-last paragraph I have added the

15

following:

16

retained counsel.

17

initial that on my copy.

18
19

He invoked his right to counsel and immediately
I have stricken the last paragraph.

changes?
MR. STURGILL:

21

THE COURT:

I do.

And with that, Ms. Hill, do you approve

those changes?

23

MS. HILL:

24

THE COURT:

25

I will

With that, mr. Sturgill, do you approve those

20

22

At

issue.

Yes, your Honor.
All right.

That takes care of that

What's the next issue?
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MR. STURGILL:

I apologize, Judge.

I skipped a page.

On page 3 under the offense title and further under the plea
agreement title under Subsection A the investigator correctly
states what the original charges were and then down below that
states that through plea negotiations the defendant pled guilty
to the following: Count 1 they have included the language
amended.

That charge was never amended.

guilty as charged.
for.

The defendant pled

So I'm not quite sure what that is there

I would ask that you strike that word amended in parens

following Count 1 in that paragraph.
MS. HILL:
THE COURT:

I don't object to that.
All right.

So I'm just -- under the

sentence through plea negotiations the defendant pled guilty to
the following: Count 1 dash I'm going to strike out the word
amended and just leave it aggravated murder, a first-degree
felony.

I think it's a misunderstanding on the pre-sentence

writer's part as to -- I don't think he understands that you
have the 6 0 days after arraignment to decide whether or not to
do capital.

So that's the difference I think.

MR. STURGILL:

Sure.

In fact, Judge, along that same

vain I'd ask you to go up to Count 1 under the originally
charged heading and strike the capital in Count 1.
THE COURT:

And just make it aggravated murder?

objection?
MS. HILL:

No.
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1

THE COURT:

All right.

I'll do the same.

I'll

So under Mr. Ragsdale was

2

strike out the word capital.

3

originally charged with the following: It reads, Count 1 dash

4

aggravated murder, a first-degree felony.

5

All right.

That change is made and initialed.

6

MR. STURGILL:

Okay.

Thank you, Judge.

The

7

bottom -- the last paragraph on that same page, page 3, it

8

reads, Once he located her, he immediately exited his vehicle

9

and fired a total of 12 shots with a handgun at Ms. Ragsdale at

10

close range hitting her with nine shots.

11

fired 12 rounds.

12

description of how many times she was shot.

13

medical examiner's report there was -- all 12 shots that he

14

fired actually hit her.

15

chest, eight entry wounds to the back and three entry wounds to

16

the head totaling nine shots or 12 shots, I'm sorry.

What we dispute and want changed is the

THE COURT:

18

You got to count for that one.

20
21

According to the

There was one entry wound to the

17

19

It is true that he

What about the extra bullet in the car?

MR. STURGILL:

Well, it was a cartridge.

It was an

empty shell casing.
MR. KAWAI:

Judge, we dispute that.

We had our

22

expert reconstruct the crime scene and we -- not that it makes

23

a huge difference, but we were quite certain that 11 of those

24

shots actually hit her.

25

her and lodged into the - - i t lodged into the grill of the

As she was falling, one shot missed
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vehicle.

That shot did not hit Ms. Ragsdale.

That shot missed

her as she was falling and went into the vehicle so 11 of the
shots did.

1 believe that there are 12 entry wounds, but one

of the entry wounds is through her hand and then it goes into
her shoulder making two entry wounds with one bullet.
MR. STURGILL:

That would be the 13th hole.

Medical

examiner -- according to the medical examiner it was one entry
wound to the chest, eight to the back and three to the head.

I

think rather fight over this, Judge, how about a compromise
that we say at least 11 rounds.
MR. KAWAI:
MS. HILL:
THE COURT:

Correc t.
And we wouldn't object to that.
So it would read, Once he located her, he

immediately exited his vehicle and fired a total of at least 11
rounds ?
MR. STURGILL:
THE COURT:

Twelve shots with a handgun.

Okay.

Fired a total of 12 shots with a

handgun at Ms. Ragsdale at close range hitting her with at
least 11 rounds or 11 shots.
Everybody agreed on that?
MS. HILL:
THE COURT:

Yes.
All right.

with at least 11 shots, all right?
initialed it.

So it will read hitting her
I've made that change and

Moving on.

MR. STURGILL:

Judge, page -- well, actually it's
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form one of the general matrix.

2

I'm not quite sure how to address this since this general

3

matrix doesn't really include aggravated murder.

4
5

THE COURT:

MR. STURGILL:

Is it before or after

Before the letters.

It's following

page --

8
9

Hang on a second.

the letters?

6
7

And I'll be honest with you

THE COURT:

Got it.

Okay.

Form one general matrix,

okay?

10

MR. STURGILL:

Yeah.

Going through the general

11

matrix, I mean, if this is to be done and we are to consider

12

this, then under the last category under the general matrix

13

where it says weapons use in current offense, it says only when

14

current conviction does not reflect weapon use or when

15

statutory enhancement is not involved do y o u give points for

16

this particular, I guess, category.

17

Our position is is if this is to be considered and

18

this is used for the Board of Pardons, then he should be

19

charged with six points for having caused injury.

20

aggravated murder charge, there's nothing in the aggravated

21

murder charge that reflects a weapon was used.

22

THE COURT:

23

MS. HILL:

The

Ms. Hill.
I'm objecting to that, your Honor.

I

24

believe the aggravated murder charge does reflect a weapon was

25

used.

It includes the aggravating factor that he put others at
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\(n9s

10

a great risk of death.
gun.

That could only be through the use of a

And factual basis here, the murder here was through use

of a gun so I think that the offense itself as charged and as
pled does reflect the use of a weapon.
THE COURT:
progression here.

Talk to me, Counsel, about the

We start with zero for none, one for

constructive possession, two points for actual possession,
three for displayed or brandished, four for actual use and then
six for injury caused.

Well, we're beyond that.

Death.

And

it seems to me in all honesty that if they wanted to go that
extra step, they could have.

It seems to me there's an

argument to be made for the fact that if you have a death, then
it somehow takes it out of this because we have more than an
injury caused.

We have a death.

And to m e this is different

degrees as it gets worse and worse construction -- constructive
possession to actual, to displayed, to actual use, to actually
using an injury if you had a weapon and here we have a death.
It seems to me that that's taken in account when you have a
charge of murder.
MR. STURGILL:

Well, and I understand that, Judge,

and I respect your opinion clearly or certainly, but I think
that there are even murders that don't -- the murder statute
does not necessarily require use of a weapon.
THE COURT:

Exactly.

You can have aggravated murder

and not have a gun.
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MR. STURGILL:

And the same is true with aggravated

2

murder and where - - had we charged the murder or charged the

3

aggravated murder or even charged the enhancement for using a

4

weapon in the Information, then it would remove this as a

5

possibility of us using that.

6

itself reflects the use of a weapon.

7

murders occur by use of a weapon, but if it is not reflected in

8

the charge itself, just because it has been used -- well,

9

because it has been used we have this.

Nothing in the actual charge
I mean, clearly most

We have this category

10

on the matrix to include points that reflect that if the charge

11

itself doesn't necessarily require that a weapon be used.

12

I can't imagine that a straight-up murder because a

13

death occurred would remove or preclude your Honor or the Board

14

of Pardons from considering this particular subsection, the

15

weapons use in current offense.

16

intent of the Board of Pardons when they drafted these

17

guidelines or the Court when they drafted these guidelines.

18

think that's precisely what it's there for, regardless of

19

whether it's a murder, ag assault or any other kinds of

20

offense, if an injury is caused and it's not reflected in the

21

charge itself, then that's the reason for this so it can be

22

taken into account and it can be recognized.

I don't think that was the

I

23

I understand that it says injury caused and the fact

24

that more than an injury occurred, I understand that approach,

25

but I don't think this was meant to not be considered if it
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went beyond injury and actually resulted in the death of a
victim.
THE COURT:
MS. HILL:
was just saying.

Anything else, Ms. Hill?
Your Honor, I agree with what the Court

I'm thinking of those scenarios with assault

cases that we have where they look at whether or not the weapon
was used and the extent to which it was used and that' s the
progression that they've set out under the matrix and so
that's -- I like what the Court was saying that we're beyond
that.

We're beyond injury.

This is at the point of death,

therefore, that category doesn't contemplate the murder charge.
THE COURT:

Anything else, Mr. Sturgill?

MR. STURGILL:
THE COURT:
several reasons.

No, your Honor.

I'm going to leave this the way it is for

No. 1, this is an issue that's not clearly

defined on the matrix itself.

We don't have anybody here from

Adult Probation and Parole or the Board of Pardons to explain
my concern.

And it appears to me that where they have left off

this ascending scale at six points for injury caused and not
gone further into like eight or ten points for an actual death,
it seems to me that under their explanation where it says when
statutory enhancement is not involved, I have statutory
enhancement regardless of whether or not there was a weapon in
a sense because this is a homicide.
We have an aggravated murder here.

He is facing life
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1

in prison and because it's an aggravated murder which

2

admittedly is for other reasons.

3

because of the proximity of the other witnesses it appears to

4

me that this matrix was not set up for a homicide.

5

they wanted points to be assessed for an actual death, then

6

they would have done something more than six points for injury

7

caused.

8

death.

9

to reconstruct what they may or may not have meant and to try

It was not for a gun, but

And had

They would have added extra points for the actual
And they haven't.

And I don't feel that it's my place

10

and fix it for them.

11

otherwise, I don't feel that I should make that distinction and

12

in essence try and fix it for them.

13

And without anyone here to explain

Bottom line is the Board of Pardons is going to have

14

all the latitude they need to keep him for as long as they

15

want.

16

difference otherwise, and I think for me to assess it doesn't

17

make sense at this juncture so I deny that request.

18

to leave the total score at zero unless there was something

19

e l s e y o u w a n t e d to address o n this p a g e , M r .

20

And I don't think six points is going it make any

MR. S T U R G I L L :

No.

Sturgill?

V e r y good, y o u r H o n o r .

21

last thing I want to address is on form two under the

22

aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. STURGILL:

25

I'm going

Judge,

All right.
Subsection 15, it's going to be very

much the same argument that I just made.

The aggravating
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factor, violence committed in the presence of a child, these
are not to be considered if they are reflected in the charges.
In this case if you'll recall -- this is Mo. 15 -THE COURT:

Under aggravating circumstances.

MR. STURGILL:

-- under aggravating circumstances.

We dismissed the domestic violence charges in the presence of a
child.

The aggravated murder, although it does require others

be placed in great risk of danger or death, it does not require
that those others that are in danger be children.

And so my

position is or the State's position is that the charges or the
charge -- the only charge that we're considering today does not
necessarily reflect that this murder occurred in the presence
of a child, so I'd ask that you find that aggravating factor.
THE COURT:
MS. HILL:

Ms. Hill.
And, your Honor, I'm just putting this

together now because we've learned of it this morning, the
additions the State was going to make.

You know, looking at

the aggravating factor, I know it's the two children we're
specifically looking at.

I know there was the adult standing

with him so it could include him.

I don't think we would

have -- I don't have a basis for an objection on that because
there were other children present.
THE COURT:

I think it's fair.

Given the fact he

drove into a church parking lot at a time when he knew people
would be coming with their families to church and children
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1

would be present, I think it's fair.

2

what pages we would reference.

3

MR. STURGILL:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. STURGILL:

Let me look back and see

Judge, page 2.

Page 2?
On page 2 under the leisure and

6

recreation subsection, the writer even acknowledges it.

7

says an aggravating factor in this offense is the fact that two

8

young children watched the defendant shoot his wife.

9

THE COURT:

Oh, there it is.

He

So it's there, but it's

10

not in the actual factual summary.

Okay.

11

a No. 2 next to that for page 2 and I will initial that as

12

well.

13

Anything else, Mr. Sturgill?

14

MR. STURGILL:

15

THE COURT:

16

corrections to be made to this?

17

M S . HILL:

18

THE COURT:

So I'm going to put

Judge, I think we'll leave it at that.

All right.

Did the defense have any

We did not, your Honor.
All right.

Then if the parties are

19

ready, I'm just going to explain to the audience when I come in

20

that we have dealt with some legal matters outside of their

21

hearing.

22

after arguments and my ruling and then we'll go forward.

23

We've made some corrections to the presentence report

MR. JOHNSON:

24

in a mike.

25

would like to speak.

Judge, I don't know if I need to speak

I just received information that three more people
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THE COURT:

And who are they?

MR. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:

Aaron Wigington.
He's the father?

MR. JOHNSON:

Yes.

The other two are neighbors,

Samantha Hollister and Karla Hall, family friends and
neighbors.

I have not talked to them.

I will go out and speak

with them as well as the other neighbors.
THE COURT:

Okay.

This is not going to become

sacrament meeting and this is not going to become an
excoriation of the defendant.
MR. STURGILL:

If we just have a few minutes, we

might be able to save some time.
MS. HILL:

Real quickly, your Honor.

I was going

to -- we were going to request credit for time served.

I don't

know if there's any objection to that.
MR. STURGILL:
MS. HILL:

No.

I think he's entitled to it.

MR. STURGILL:

Yeah, I think he's entitled to it by

statute.
THE COURT:
give it to him.

And I make the recommendation.

I can't

I can just recommend that the Board of Pardons

give it to him.
MR. KAWAI:

Judge, is that something you want us to

raise in court?
THE COURT:

No, I've got it in my notes.
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I've got it

1

on a page I didn't give to you.

2

related it we've got 365 days for the first year which took him

3

January 6th through January 6th and another 24 days which adds

4

up to 3 89 days, okay?

5

MR. STURGILL:

And the way I calculated

This might sound petty, Judge, but I

6

think part of the concern that I had or we've had with -

7

guess the concern that Jamie Wigington has had is that she

8

doesn't feel like her children are really being recognized and

9

accounted for and so if there' s anything you could say that

10

or I

would --

11

THE COURT:

I'm going to make some comments at the

12

end.

And I intend to talk about the fact what I just said that

13

he came into that parking lot knowing that families would be

14

there and that these children are harmed.

15

MR. STURGILL:

16

THE COURT:

17
18

That would mean a lot.

Okay.

soon as you're ready.

All right.

Let Jennie know as

We'll go off the record.

(The following proceedings were held in open court.)

19

THE COURT:

This is the matter of the State of Utah,

20

plaintiff, versus David Ragsdale, defendant.

21

No. 081400235.

22
23

This is our file

Counsel, would you put your appearances on the
record.

24

MR. JOHNSON:

25

MR. STURGILL:

Craig Johnson State of Utah.
Dave Sturgill on behalf of the State.
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MR. KAWAI:

Your Honor, Dusty Kawai, Andy Howell and

Debbie Hill for Mr. Ragsdale.
THE COURT:

And I note Mr. Ragsdale is here as well.

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for waiting.
dealt with a number of legal issues in my chambers.

We have

We have

made some corrections after arguments made to me with regard to
the presentence report and I have made those changes on the
presentence report and have initialed that report and the
amended report will go up to the Board of Pardons.
I just have a few words I'd like to say before we
start today.

The defendant has previously entered a guilty

plea to a criminal homicide aggravated murder, a non-capital
first-degree felony, at which time the parties stipulated to a
sentence of an indeterminate term of not less than 2 0 years and
which may be for life.

In other words, the possibility of

parole, but no guarantee of parole.
The attorneys for both parties conferred with me in
chambers several days before the defendant entered his plea of
guilty, explained the agreement between the parties and
informed me that the victims and their families had been
involved in the discussions and had approved the agreement.
They answered my questions in a very frank and open discussion
of this matter.

At the conclusion of that discussion I agreed

to be bound by their agreement.
At the time Mr. Ragsdale entered his plea, and that
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was on November 26th, 2008, the plea agreement was fully
explained on the record and I questioned Mr. Ragsdale very
carefully before he entered his plea as to his understanding of
what the sentence in this matter would be.

He indicated to me

very clearly and he understood that he would be sentenced to
prison for at the very least 2 0 years and that he could
possibly be in prison for the rest of his life.

He also

indicated that he understood that although he had spoken with
various experts who had indicated how long he might spend at
the prison, no one could guarantee what the Board of Pardons
would ultimately decide in that respect.
He understood that the final decision would be up to
the Board of Pardons.

Therefore, ladies and gentlemen, we are

here today for a sentencing hearing in which the outcome is
already known to all.

I will sentence Mr. Ragsdale to an

indeterminate term of not less than 20 years in the Utah State
Prison and which also may be for life at the end of this
hearing.
Nevertheless, I am very interested in what you have
to say to me today and I will listen very carefully.

I will

allow the defendant to make his presentation first, then the
State and then any last words from the defendant.
Mr. Kawai.
MR. KAWAI:

Your Honor, would you prefer me to stay

at the table?
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THE COURT:
the podium.

We will have a better record if you're at

And I would ask any other speakers to come to the

podium.
MR. KAWAI:

Judge, thank you for accommodating Mr.

Ragsdale's medical issues that he had yesterday.

And we're

grateful you were able to accommodate those today and also -THE COURT:
higher.

Would you take the microphone up a little

Thank you.
MR. KAWAI:

-- and also because particularly that the

Palizzis had flown in from Washington.

We are grateful that

you were able to accommodate their schedule as well.
Judge, I and our defense team, Mr. Howell and Ms.
Hill, we were assigned to Mr. Ragsdale in July of 2008, so it's
been roughly seven months that we've been working with him.
It's been shortly over a year that this tragedy occurred.

When

we first met David, I honestly didn't know how we were going to
go about resolving this case.

And I think this Court was able

to make its own observations at the time of the preliminary
hearing as to his demeanor, his attitude.

I just want to tell

you, your Honor, and particularly the Palizzis who are also in
the courtroom that from the time that we met Mr. Ragsdale about
two months into it I particularly saw a huge change in his
heart.

He went from being defiant, he had excuses for the

actions that occurred, wasn't taking responsibility for those
actions, and that changed over the two month period of time to
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1

where when I would visit with David, I personally would feel

2

the gravity of his pain and the remorse for his actions.

3

I have personally witnessed him weep for the loss of

4

Kristy, weep for the pain that he's caused to Ann and Al and

5

their boys, weep for the pain that he's caused for his own two

6

sons, Brandon and Carter.

7

his heart change, that I knew or I had hope we were able to

8

resolve this matter.

9

David is hopeful will bring closure, at least some closure to

And it was at that time when 1 saw

And that resolution we are hopeful and

10

the Palizzi family, help the parties move on in their lives.

11

David knows that what he did on the 6th of January 2 008 he can

12

never replace what he took away.

13

members of the Palizzis will have to live with that loss

14

forever.

15

David is a broken man for his choices that he made on that day.

16

He knows that the family

I know he will be living with that loss forever.

Your Honor, there has been talk of the medication

17

that he was on.

We had Dr. Pablo Stewart do evaluations of

18

that medication.

19

dosages of the multiple medications that he was on that day

20

greatly contributed to that.

21

There were no legal defenses that we could make because of that

22

information.

23

are on high dosages of medications and don't do the horrible

24

acts that David did, but I look at what happened on the 6th of

25

January, 2008, and it just seems like there was a storm

And it is his medical opinion that the high

That's not a legal defense.

It's not an excuse for his actions.

Many people
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brewing.

That storm was exacerbated by the medications that

David was on, and it's just a tragedy as to what happened.
I personally, Mr. Howell and Ms. Hill, we've all seen
that change in his heart to where he has taken full
responsibility for his actions.

We're grateful that we were

able to resolve this case for him and for the Palizzis and
that's all I have to say about this.
THE COURT:

All right.

Do you have anybody else that

wants to speak?
MR. KAWAI:

I think Mr. Ragsdale would like to say

some words.
THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Ragsdale, would you come

up to the podium.
THE DEFENDANT:

I'd like to read a statement, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

That's fine.

Why don't we adjust the

microphone for him.
THE DEFENDANT:

I would like to express my deep

remorse and sorrow for the terrible act that I've committed.
There is no way I can apologize in a manner that can be
satisfactory to those who have been affected by my horrific
action.

To say that I'm sorry seems far to weak to attempt the

lack of the woman I promised to spend eternity with.
essentially orphaned my children.

I

I forever gave my family a

black eye, not to mention taking away a son and a brother.
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

I've caused incalculable hurt and loss to Kristi's family.

How

any of these people will ever be able to forgive me is beyond
me.

In committing the most terrible of all crimes I have

severely hurt everyone that I truly care about.
I want you to know that I am confident that I would
not have taken Kristi's life had I not been on the medications
that I was on.
my actions.

That being said, I take full responsibility for

I made my own terrible decisions and I cannot

blame anybody but myself.

I am deeply sorry to everyone but

mostly to my dear wife Kristy whose life was cut short unfairly
I can never make amends for what I've done and I hope that
sometime in this life or the next that I can obtain forgiveness
for everyone that I've hurt.
I want Ann and Al to know that I love my boys Brandon
and Carter with all my heart and that I miss them so much.

And

I want to thank you from the bottom of my heart for taking such
good care of them and I know that they are in good hands.
Thank you.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. KAWAI:

Your Honor, I believe that the Ragsdale

family also has a short statement they'd like me to read.
THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Ragsdale, if you'd like,

you can sit down.
MR. KAWAI:

Your Honor, Ted and Judy Ragsdale are

present in the courtroom and they've asked on behalf of their
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT
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family, the Ragsdale family, that I make this statement.
When we speak to our son David, it would be
-impossible for us to overstate the grief Dave feels and
expresses about the terrible act he committed.
bear that pain forever.

He will have to

We have to live with it.

go out to Kristi's family.

We are sorry.

Our hearts

Our thoughts now

turn to their children and it is our prayer that they will know
their parents love for them.
THE COURT:

Our focus now should be on them.

All right.

Thank you.

Anything else

from the defense at this point?
MR. KAWAI:

No, your Honor .

THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. JOHNSON:

From the State.

Judge, there are a handful of people

who would like to address the Court.

After that, the State

will make a few remarks, but if we can first hear from Ann
Palizzi.
THE COURT:

All right.

Mrs. Palizzi, will you please

come forward.
MS. PALIZZI:

Thank you, Judge Laycock, for giving me

this opportunity to speak.
THE COURT:

Could you spell your name for the court

reporter?
MS. PALIZZI:

Sure.

Ann, A-n-n, Palizzi,

P-a-1-i-z-z-i.
THE COURT:

Thank you.
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MS. PALIZZI:

I've thought of what I would want to

2

say for a full year now, and it's come to me that I need to

3

represent the voice of Kristy.

4

of her personal writings and her journal and her personal

5

conversations that we've had.

6

Dave, my mother's intuition told me they were wrong for each

7

other.

8

this situation the opposites were too great.

9

really wrong from the very beginning because there were too

And these are taken from some

As a mother, when Kristy met

And there's a saying that opposites attract, but in
So they were

10

many differences.

Kristy was a social butterfly who loved to

11

play and Dave was more of a recluse who liked to hold his

12

secrets.

13

regimented and structured.

He didn't like to take vacations.

14

He was more

He worked hard.

Kristy was very fun and spontaneous.

She loved to

15

spend his money and he liked to save his money.

Kristy was

16

very very service oriented and Dave was more self oriented.

17

Kristy wanted a spiritual life and Dave wanted a life of the

18

world.

19

Dave -- I think that kicked in h i s O C D a n d h i s anxiety because

20

she w a s so random.

21

and this is one time that I really hoped that I was wrong.

22

made me choose between Dave or her.

23

have to accept David into her life if I wanted a relationship

24

with her.

25

around him and I would love him.

Kristy was very very random in her personality and

I k n e w t h e y w e r e w r o n g from the beginning

And so I did.

She

She told me that I would

I accepted him as a son and I put my
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We trusted him to take care of our daughter.
betrayed us in the most critical way of trust.

He has

Kristy really

wanted more than anything unconditional love and acceptance and
that's something Dave couldn't give her and it's because they
were such opposites.

I don't think Dave ever learned that the

more he harassed her about something, the more she was
determined to do the exact opposite.

And as her mother, I

learned that very quick that if I really tried to nail her on
something, she's going to do the opposite, but I don't think
Dave ever learned that.

So I think they were in some ways two

guilty people in the party as far as the relationship.
The last year of her marriage became very very
difficult for her.

The verbal abuse and the emotional abuse

was starting to escalate and through Dave's emotional abuse it
almost killed Kristy's spirit.
psycho bitch.

He started calling her the

And she finally in September went and started

getting counseling.

And as she got counseling, she started

empowering herself.

And when Dave would criticize her, she

started throwing it right back in his face and telling him that
those were his issues and she wasn't going to carry that
anymore and she was not going to carry the guilt that he was
trying to make her feel.
I think that's when things really started escalating
out of control, when she was no longer willing to carry his
garbage and his baggage.

She begged and begged for him to get
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1

help, to get counseling, and he always said that she was the

2

psycho bitch that had the problems and he had none, but I think

3

we can now see that he did have problems, but he was in denial

4

and would not accept the reality that he needed to get some

5

help.

6

I want to read you some of her writings.

This will

7

tell you the state of mind she was in.

She wrote thoughts and

8

ideas and they were sort of disjointed in some ways because she

9

was putting down just a rough draft for writing lyrics.

And

10

the first one

11

the title of the song was Resuscitation.

12

pleading for somebody to resuscitate her and give her the

13

breath of life.

14

toxicity, that she was drowning in toxicity.

15

need a resuscitation.

16

hers until after her death when the police let me go into the

17

house to find a photo to send to the mortician so he could do

18

the reconstruction of her face.

19

I found.

20

she n e e d e d to b r e a t h and she's b e g g i n g

21

breath.

22

she wrote in September and she was -- it was -And she's begging and

And she just felt like she was smothering in
And she says I

Now, I did not find these writings of

That was the first thing that

So in S e p t e m b e r she's f e e l i n g l i k e she's drowning and
for s o m e o n e to give her

Then in October she wrote this one.

I think it's

23

very profound because it tells you the state of mind Kristy was

24

in.

25

it some and she entitled it Open Heart Surgery.

She was a fan of Grey's Anatomy so I think that affected
Lying on the
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table, cold room, losing consciousness, wake up to pain,
darkness, cold, alone.

Chest wide open.

Where is everybody?

Why am I left like this damaged, exposed?
or shredded to pieces?

Where are the people to mend, to

complete the surgery to heal my heart.
this was.

Is my heart missing

I thought that' s what

I trusted them to go in and fix the problem and now

I'm lying here too weak to scream for help, to scream out.
just can't leave me here to die.

You

What crisis calls for leaving

me on the table cold and exposed with my chest cut open and a
missing heart.
And when I read this, that was the description of her
autopsy as the mortician told me about her autopsy.

They did

have her on a metal table in a cold room and she was cut into
the chest so he could do the investigation into which organs
had been affected.

And her heart was shredded by the bullets.

And so two and a half months before she died she wrote about
her own autopsy.

To me that's chilling, but that tells me the

state of mind that she was in.
I'm not saying that it was all Dave's creation, but I
do want you to know that because of Kristy's personality, her
personality was bigger than life.

She did not die in a vacuum

and quietly where people didn't notice that she died because
she was bigger than life.

Her relationships and her

friendships were bigger than life.

And we have heard from 40

different states and we've heard around the globe of how this
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has affected people.

2

spread one person's action could affect so many people and the

3

connectedness we have in a global community.

4

It's helped me to really realize how wide

We hear from total complete strangers who have been

5

profoundly affected by this.

What I'm hearing from them is

6

they suffer from deep depression, anger and fear.

7

I want to tell you thank you for not giving Dave bail.

8

were some people who were so angry that they told me they were

9

ready to kill David.

And, Judge,
There

And I am so glad he didn't get out on

10

bail because then there'd be another family involved in a

11

crime.

12

of little children who now have to deal with the fact that it's

13

a reality that daddy can kill mommy.

14

Dave stole the innocence of hundreds or maybe thousands

There were many children in the church that day.

15

They have nightmares.

16

of fear in Kristy's neighborhood.

17

have either gotten their concealed weapon's license or in the

18

process of getting it and that is a real small neighborhood of

19

about three blocks, but those individuals feel like they never

20

want to feel vulnerable again, that they don't have the

21

capacity to protect their wife's and their children.

22

that they are taking action to get these concealed weapon

23

permits tells me that those men are feeling fear.

24
25

They have a lot of fear.

There's a lot

There's 31 individuals who

The fact

There's absolutely no words that are adequate for me
to express the experience that I had and the feelings that I
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had to see my daughter fall into the snow and see her crimson
red blood just draining into that snow.

It's a vivid memory

that will live with me forever, but I think David's acts with
the ultimate act of selfishness, did he ever consider all those
children?

How it would affect them?

The children who

witnessed that and that saw a bullet rip through Kristy's face?
That's a memory that no four or eight year old should ever have
to carry with them for the rest of their life.
Did he ever consider Dr. Russell Rhodes who did the
CPR and every time he'd give her a chest compression had
Kristy's blood on her hand.
neighbor.

Dr. Rhodes was her next door

Did he consider how it would affect those people

giving CPR?

Did he consider Robert Williams and the effect it

would have on him and his family.
mouth to mouth resuscitation.

He was the EMT that gave

Did he ever consider the police

officers who had to work the scene and clean up that horrible
bloody mess?

A lot of them were rookies and this was the first

really bad criminal experience they'd had to deal with and
they've had to have counseling.

Did he ever consider the

coroner and the effect it would have on the coroner or the
morticians who had to reconstruct Kristy's face and try to make
it presentable for a funeral?
And in his selfishness did he ever think of Kristy's
family and her friends?

And did he ever in his selfishness at

the time consider how this would affect Brandon and Carter and
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their nightmares and their fear?

Little Brandon was four years

old and he would ask me over and over is there a lock on the
jail?

I says Brandon there is.

the outside, grandma?
can never get out.

Is it locked on the inside or

It's locked on the outside.

So David

I says why do you ask me that, Brandon?

And he said daddy yelled at and mommy and daddy killed mommy
and daddy yelled at me and when he gets out, he will shoot me.
That's a horrible fear for a little four year old to have to
fear his own father.
These little boys had their trust totally shattered
that day, but we, myself, the therapist, have worked very hard
to help these little boys learn to trust.
time they have learned to trust grandma.
them the truth.

And at this point in
I will always tell

I will never try to hide facts from them

because they need to know there is one person in this world
that they can trust.
sense of abandonment.

These little boys feared and had a great
And they had anxiety separation.

And

there were two or three months where I couldn' t even take a
shower without them being right there with me because they were
too afraid to have me out of their sight.
I want David to know that as long as there's breath
in this body that I will give his boys every opportunity for
education, stability, structure.

I will make sure they have

educational opportunities to become professionals, that they
will have integrity as their older brothers, my older sons.
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And they will never have to lie to make a living.

Sometimes I

go and stand on the blood stains of Kristy's blood in the
parking lot at the church and I vow to myself that I will never
let the evilness of her death conquer me or my family.

I am

determined that righteousness will prevail over evilness in my
family and particularly these two little boys.
It seems like Dave was throwing a big tantrum that
day.

His behavior the last three months had been exactly like

Brandon's who was four.

It seemed like Dave was operating on a

four year old's maturity level.

And what the therapist told me

to do with Brandon when he had a tantrum was give him time out
in the red bathroom and not let him out.

And I' m asking you to

give Dave time out because that's what he needs for the tantrum
that he has pulled.

I personally have forgiven Dave and I have

forgiven him early on.

And it's because little Brandon and

Carter deserve pure love.

And if I hold bad feelings toward

their father, I cannot love them in the purity that they
deserve.
And sometimes in the beginning when they would act
like David, that would trigger my anger, but those little boys
do not deserve to be held hostage for their father's behavior.
I forgive Dave, but I'm not ready for reconciliation.

I don't

go to the bars or casinos or the penitentiary to find friends.
I don't have enough time right now to do that because my focus
is on my two little sons that need a hundred percent of my
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

ICTl

energy.
And I want to conclude this with thanks to the media,
to the community, the legal system, everyone who has been so
gracious to our family.

Utah community has been incredibly

gracious to us and I'm very grateful for that.

Thank you for

your t ime.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. JOHNSON:

Mr. Johnson.

Judge, Jamie Wigington would like to

address the Court.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. STURGILL:
husband is Aaron.

Ms. Wigington.

Judge, this is Jamie Wigington.

Her

Would it be okay if they stood at the

lecturn together?
THE COURT:

Sure.

Sure.

Come on up.

So would you spell your last name.
MS. WIGINGTON:
THE COURT:

Jamie and Aaron, A-a-r-o-n.

MS. WIGINGTON:
THE COURT:

W-i-g-i-n-g-t-o-n.

And J-a-m-i-e.

Thank you.

MS. WIGINGTON:

Go ahead.

First off it's really hard for me to

hear David's statement or those who defend him how sorry he is
because I don't feel it undoes anything that was done.
I'm glad that he's sorry or that he says he's sorry,
but like Ann said it's affected so many people and my husband
and my two boys were the ones who were the witnesses that were
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so close to those bullets and I was home with my daughter and
my four month old baby.

I got a knock at the door and a

neighbor was there and I saw all these cars driving around and
something just didn't feel right and she said, Jamie, something
horrible has happened.
family.

And immediately I thought it's my

And she said they were okay, but it's Kristy.

been shot and she's gone.
neighbor.

And I knew Kristy.

She was my friend.

She's

She was my

I had my friend Allie come in

and sit with me while I waited to find my family.
My boys were with my husband at the church and so I
waited for about a hour until they brought my boys back and my
husband had to stay to give his statement.

And they said that

when they got there, they were walking to the church and a man,
my four-year-old said a man shot a lady and she fell to the
ground and he said I thought I was going to die.

And my

husband brought them into the church and he went back out to
see if he could help and they were bawling and scared and they
thought he was going out and he was going to die.
And so they sat in the church crying hoping he would
come back.

And so they were just terrified.

understood more.

He saw the gun.

My eight-year-old

He saw what happened and he

understood more, but he was still terrified.

My four-year-old

has since -- he's five now, but he's always talking about the
black policemen because Dave was wearing dark clothing and he's
terrified of the black policemen.

He has nightmares about the
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black policemen.

2

brings it back to him and he's terrified.

3

If we hear policemen or hear sirens, it just

I was with my friends at lunch and there were some

4

policemen and I went up to them and I said do you think you

5

could say something to him so that he would know that the

6

policemen are good and that this man was not a policemen.

7

sorry.

8

THE COURT:

9

M S . WIGINGTON:

I'm

It's okay.
And so they did speak to him.

We've

10

tried as much as we can to get him to realize that policemen

11

are good and we're still working with him.

12

every single night when we put him to bed he asked can dad

13

sleep downstairs tonight, every single night since this

14

happened.

15

upstairs because we need to try to get back to normal, but he's

16

scared.

17

Our eight-year-old

And sometimes he will and most of the time he comes

He doesn't want to sleep in his room alone.
He has affected so many people.

He doesn't realize.

18

When it happened, Aaron's mom was terrified.

19

have been shot.

20

our number one priority is try to make our boys feel safe again

21

which is so hard.

22

matters.

23

being punished and that he will be in prison so people can feel

24

safe because.

25

Her son could

My mom could have lost her grandchildren.

So

So when he says he's sorry, nothing else

He did what he did.

And I am grateful that he's

If he was out, I wouldn't feel safe.

I am grateful for the People who have worked on the
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case and I do feel like this is a good choice.

It's been hard

for me throughout the process, because my kids were so
involved, wishing that there was more that could be done
because the truth is nothing would be good enough because
nothing can change what happened.

He's changed our lives

forever and the lives of our neighborhood and the community and
that can't be undone.
And that's all I have to say.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Thank you.

MR. WIGINGTON:

I'd like to just take a moment, I

don't know if it's possible for a man that I've never met
before to have the biggest affect on my life that I'll probably
ever have from anybody else.
walked into church.

That day me and my two boys

Dave Ragsdale passed us in his car and a

couple feet away was Kristy.

And we saw his car stop.

And we

continued walk into church and heard the first gunshot and
looked over and took a minute to register what was happening.
At that moment my two boys saw the fear in my face, my eyes,
and we started to run as fast as we can.

And for two little

boys to keep up with me, I don't know if their feet touched the
ground or not.
As I passed them off to another lady walking into the
church yelling at her to call 911, I returned back out to
Kristy's body.

Another gentleman was already out there.

rolled her over and saw the bullet holes.

We

I proceeded to go

L
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out and get my car mats from my car to give her something warm

2

to lay on other than the cold asphalt.

3

was a couple more gentlemen out there and they started giving

4

her CPR.

5

something that I'll never get over.

6

a while.

7

that her body may be taken is something I'll never get over.

8

I'll have moments where I'll be fine and then something will

9

pop into my mind and then it starts the chain reaction all over

10

As I got back, there

And hearing that air exit her lungs as it rattled is
I'll hear it every once in

Hearing a lady offer a prayer out to God behind me

again.

11

After half an hour being out there with Kristy's

12

body, they allowed me to go back into the church to get my two

13

boys.

14

the fear in their eyes as they looked up at me and they said I

15

didn't know if you were coming back.

16

written down on a piece of paper trying to reassure himself, he

17

wrote down in big letters is dad dead?

18

wrote no.

19

address that.

20

never thought possible.

21

And the hardest thing for me that whole day was seeing

And my eight year old had

And big letters he

And he handed me that and I didn't know how to
And it was and has affected our lives in ways I

He still does have nightmares.

That first night

22

sleeping down there he'd wake up and make sure I was still

23

there with him.

24

boys into men.

25

guide that a little better, but it's something that's affected

It is something that will forever mold the two
Hopefully through me and my wife we can help
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them to their core.

In their video statements they've given

hearing them say that they were in fear of their lives.

It was

something a little bit nerve racking that a father should hear
their kids being in fear for their lives.
Fathers are supposed to protect their kids and
there' s no way I could have protected them from that.

And I do

appreciate all the stuff that the Lehi Police Department has
done for us.

Neighbors have been wonderful and we've really

bound together as a neighborhood and a community and I
appreciate your time and efforts into this case and that's it.
Thank you very much.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. JOHNSON:

Judge, I was made aware earlier that

there were four other individuals who wanted to make a
statement.

Mr. Sturgill and I spoke with them before this

hearing and if I could just inquire to see if they would like
to make a statement.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. JOHNSON:

Judge, Terri Hunter would like to first

be heard and then Samantha Hollister.
THE COURT:
MS. HUNTER:
THE COURT:
MS. HUNTER:

All right.

Is it Terry with an i or y?

T-e-r-r-i, H-u-n-t-e-r.
All right.
I'll be brief.

I'm sorry.

There are

many silent broken hearts that are not here today because they
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couldn't take coming and that includes my home with my eight

2

kids.

3

lives were changed by this single act.

4

learned a new fear.

5

anger of my ex-husband, the loss of safety and their place of

6

spiritual learning.

7

anxiety also.

8

idea whose lives have been changed.

9

ultimately to quit my 9 year career as an ER nurse.

10

Struggling with fear, anger and also compassion.

Our

My children have

They fear the loss of their mother.

The

My children struggle with separation

There are many people whom David Ragsdale has no
This act caused me

I was also blessed this year to be able to spend a

11

lot of time with Brandon and Carter helping Ann.

12

my home and I observed Brandon light up as he would participate

13

with our family, especially participate in my motherly acts to

14

my children.

15

eyes as if he was looking through me and something far past me.

16

I've watched as they've clung to their grandmother for safety

17

and security.

18

raised in a home of love with music and good values.

19

is not for Kristy.

20

It's for Kristy's family, her parents.

21

in our neighborhood.

22

my children.

23

They were in

I would rock Carter and he would look into my

There's much comfort knowing that they will be

I know she's okay.

My pain

It's for those boys.
It's for our young ones

It's for the little children.

It's for

My young child brought home a journal from school

24

just this last month with a picture of a lady that died at our

25

church who was shot last year.

This is definitely impacted a
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lot of people and a lot of lives.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:

Samantha Hollister.
Okay.

MS. HOLLISTER:
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Would you spell your last name.

H-o-l-l-i-s-t-e-r.

Thank you.

MS. HOLLISTER:

Thank you for this opportunity.

My

husband and I moved to Utah from the LA area mostly for the
reason that we wanted to live someplace that was safe and that
was family friendly.

We lived across the street from Kristy.

I became good friends with her.

When I saw the sad side of

Kristy, I knew there was a burden and a hurt behind those eyes.
I feel tremendous guilt that I didn't know how serious it was
and how bad it was getting.

Although toward the end we became

increasingly aware because it was hard to hide.
On the morning that Kristy was murdered my husband
was sick and I went to church with my daughter.

And as I drove

up in our truck, Dave was leaving in a car right as we were
entering the parking lot, and as I drove by that spot where
Kristy had just fallen, it had just happened and I didn't know
what had happened and so I parked and all I know is that a
woman had fallen in the snow and was bleeding and needed help.
So I'd taken off my coat and put it under her head so that
those working on her - - s o she would be comforted and that
maybe she could possibly be resuscitated, but she was gone.

I
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1

would learn later that she was -- there was no chance of her

2

coming up from that.

3

I have to tell you that every snowy Sunday morning

4

when I go to church, I can still picture her there in that spot

5

and I don't want to remember her that way, but I do.

6

such a beautiful, wonderful, giving person and she didn't

7

deserve that.

8

about it because he thinks s what if you had gotten there a few

9

seconds sooner, you could have been in the middle of that.

It's such a public place.

She is

My husband is angry

And

10

you go through the what ifs, you know, what if, because I park

11

normally right where she was shot.

12

There has been some good that has come through that

13

experience.

I know that we as a neighborhood, we look after

14

one another more.

15

there is problems, we don't take each other for granted.

16

check in on each other.

17

night -- I have a daughter who is the same age as Carter and

18

they would play together.

19

down on her holding her before I put her into bed that I am so

20

much more grateful that I have her, that I can raise her, that

21

I have that blessing that I take for granted, can be taken away

22

at any time if someone chooses to take that away from me.

23

There's nothing I can do, but I am blessed to stay here and

24

have my daughter I can raise and that' s an opportunity Kristy

25

will never have.

We take each other more seriously.

For that I'm grateful.

When
We

I know that at

I know that at night when I look

And my heart breaks for that because I'm so
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grateful to be a mother and I know she loved being a mother.
I just wanted to make it known that this definitely
has impacted so many people.

I'm just one of many people that

aren't here today telling you how much she was loved, how much
she impacted us for good and how much she'll be missed.
there is fear.
receive bail.

And

I'm grateful that Dave received -- did not
I'm grateful that I don't have to worry right

now that he's walking the streets because I know a lot of
people would be afraid to go to church, to be in our
neighborhood, and I don't think people should have to worry
about that after what we have been through.
My husband is one of those people that has decided to
get his concealed weapon's permit.

He's angry and upset and

there was nothing he could do to prevent this, but I know he
doesn't ever want us to go through anything like that again and
if that helps us to gain a little bit of power and a little bit
of sanity back, I think that's what he's trying to do and I
don't blame him.

But I am grateful for the example Ann has

been to me and her family of strength in this terrible,
terrible situation.

I'm grateful for all the people that have

helped us to try and work through it as best as we can.
I'm grateful for this opportunity to speak today.
THE COURT:
MR. JOHNSON:

And

Thank you.

Thank you.
Judge, the last person that would like

to speak would be Matt Soren, a relative of Kristy.
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THE COURT:

All right.

3

MR. SOREN:

S-o-r-e-n.

4

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

5

MR. SOREN:

Thank you for letting me have the

2

6
7

Would you spell your last

name.

opportunity to get up here, your Honor.
I decided to come up on behalf of my wife and her

8

sister whom are cousins of Kristy.

They don't have the --

9

there's a lot of people that wanted to say things and just

10

don't -- actually didn't even feel like they could come.

We

11

weren't at the scene of the accident.

We've

12

been close to Kristy, you know, we're her family, but it

13

affected us.

14

I mean, something like that affected us so much more than I

15

would have expected or expected that it could or anticipate.

16

Our children, of course, we couldn't hide it from them.

17

know our children weren't there, but they fear for their lives

18

and safety.

19

to t h e i r h o m e for C h r i s t m a s .

20

t o g e t h e r , y o u know, the other side of h e r family.

21

at every family gathering.

22

through my mind, things I wish I could have done for her before

23

this happened.

24
25

We weren't there.

Especially my wife and her sister so much more.

And I

It kind of turned things around because we've been
Kristy a l w a y s p u l l e d her

family

And she w a s

And there's a lot of things going

You know, we tried to help them.

Children afterwards were constantly afraid, you know,
both of our children kept wanting to make sure the doors were
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locked, wanted to make sure Dave couldn't get out of prison.
They were afraid he would come and kill them.

Actually we had

a little bit of that fear too because we tried to make sure we
could support her and help her from the situation before this
happened and to try to have -- try to rebuild stability in our
family to help them understand that this isn't right.
wrong.

This shouldn't happen.

It's

And to help them have the

stability back in their home, to know that they are safe with
us and that, you know, even though a father could do that to a
mother, that it's not normal and show them everything we can to
show increase in love and safety.
I mean, my sisters - - m y wife has had struggle with
depression, counseling.

A lot of things that have gone on that

is making us -- it's strengthening us.

We're just grateful for

the police department and all the people that have been so
supportive.

We're just grateful for everything that has been

done and we do want to thank you for that.
THE COURT:
MR. JOHNSON:
indulgence.

Thank you.
Thank you, your Honor, for your

That's all the statements we have.

comment on a few things.

As you can see, Judge, it's no secret

there's many victims here.
represent a larger body.

If I can just

The people that have spoken today

Others that you've heard from at the

preliminary hearing, the Wiggins, the Dukes.
Kristy's children who Ann is raising.

Talked about

Think about this Sunday
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church.

The whole ward they were part of that were starting
The neighborhood that's rallied around.

This has

really affected a whole community.
Lehi city, Utah county, it's been widely publicized.
And as you've heard, the response Ann has gotten from across
the United States of America and the world via the internet.
It has had a profound effect, but this is really a day to focus
on the life of Kristy, that Kristy led.

She would have been 31

now.

Her birthday would have been little more than three weeks

ago.

This horrific act occurred on her 30th birthday in front

of her mother at the beginning of sacrament meeting in the
church parking lot where she went and attended, the ultimate
sanctuary.
Kristy was a mother, a daughter, a sister, a cousin,
a neighbor.

She affected so many people.

robbed from us on January 6th.

And all that was

The defendant -- Mr. Kawai

talks about the medications, how they contributed, talked about
the report that's cited in the PSI, but this wasn't a snap
decision, your Honor.

The PSI also references to the

protective order that was granted in early December.

At that

time it was as a result of a comment about the defendant
bringing a gun to Kristy's house and that his brother and
sister were present.

You heard about neighbors and Ann's view

of the de-escalation of their relationship for months
beforehand.

I personally listened to all the jail phone calls
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that are referred to in the PSI and can see the defendant's
lack of remorse up to the time that Mr. Kawai talked about
right after the killing.
We talk about victims.

We also talk about Jamie and

Aaron Wigington and their two boys.
that they were witnesses to this.
they were victims.

Jamie got up and mentioned
They weren't just witnesses,

They were approximately 20 feet away from

where Kristy was shot in the line of fire and a bullet was
lodged in the radiator of the van they had just passed by not 2
or 3 feet away.

It was a miracle they were not shot in the

crossfire.
As these 12 bullets whizzed through Kristy throughout
this parking lot, crowded parking lot, the beginning of
sacrament meeting, it's a miracle there aren't more people that
were directly injured or even killed.

And it's because of

their proximity and Ann's that the State was able to pursue the
aggravating factor in this case.
a straight murder case.

Otherwise, it would have been

Sentencing difference, as the Court

knows, is the difference between 15 and life and 20 to life,
but it's more than that.

The aggravating language is on the

charge that he pled guilty to and will be before the Board of
Pardons and that, we believe, will be significant in their
decision of whether or not to parole Mr. Ragsdale at any time.
We hope that the Palizzis and the Wigingtons and
their children and all those who were affected by this will
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continue to heal through the years old, but this, as you heard,

2

is not going to be a simple fix.

3

Board of Pardons will never release the defendant.

4

this is the proper plea and sentence under the circumstances.

5

This will bring a tremendous amount of closure to these

6

families.

7

resolution and send Mr. Ragsdale to prison today.

State also hopes that the

And we ask the Court adopt the agreed upon

8

THE COURT:

Anything else, Mr. Kawai?

9

MR. KAWAI:

No, your Honor.

10

THE COURT:

All right.

11

We believe

Counsel, could I just have

two of you from each side come up.

12

(Off the record,)

13

THE COURT:

Thank you.

I have a question.

Ladies and gentlemen, I'm going to make

14

just a few comments before I sentence the defendant.

15

there's very little that I can say that will add to what has

16

been said with great eloquence today by the People who have

17

spoken to me.

18

hearing very clearly.

19

incalculable cruelty and selfishness on Mr. Ragsdale's part.

20

And it's going to have lifelong consequences of an extremely

21

serious nature for dozens of people.

22

I think

I remember the facts from the preliminary
This was literally one moment of

My greatest concern is for a rather limited set of

23

people.

I have great concern for the Ragsdale children.

24

two boys are going to be raised in a wonderful home with their

25

grandparents and they are going to have all those advantages
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there.

And I'm confident that the Palizzis are going to do

everything they can to bring these children up in what will
feel as much as possible to be a normal home with all the
normal advantages they could have had in their own home with
their mother and father.

But nevertheless these children have

to deal with the loss of both parents, and for the rest of
their lives they will have to explain why they lost their
mother when they were very young and where their father is.
And they will have to deal with that in a manner that I hope
will -- I know will be aided by their grandparents and their
family, but I just can't imagine two little boys having to grow
up with that burden placed upon them.
I also have great concern for the two Wigington boys
who through no fault of their own were exposed to something
that I suspect their parents don't even let them watch on TV.
And for them, having heard their parents today and having also
read the letters that were submitted to the Court, this has
been a horrific experience from which they are not recovering
with any great speed and it's no surprise.
I also have great concern for Mrs. Palizzi.

She's

about my age and I cannot imagine how painful it would be to
watch your son-in-law gun down your only daughter and to relive
that as she explained in her letter to me.

I don't know how

you could not relive that like she still does.

And I also have

concerns for Mr. Palizzi and the rest of that family who lost
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1

their daughter and sister.

2

recovery for them.

3

Wigington who held his two boys hands and ran after they

4

observed this murder.

5

the aftereffects even though she wasn't there.

6

It's going to be a lifetime of

I also have great concern for Mr.

And Mrs. Wigington who is dealing with

We have a small group of people here who are

7

suffering incalculable pain because of something Mr. Ragsdale

8

did.

9

drugs that he was prescribed and using, but as I view the

I understand the claims about the various psychotropic

10

evidence from the preliminary hearing and what I've heard today

11

that gave me added details that I didn't even get at that

12

hearing, it's very clear to me that regardless of whatever

13

prescription drugs he was taking, he knew very well what he was

14

doing.

15

The testimony was from several people that they saw

16

him sitting in his BMW on the south side of the church, as I

17

recall it was the south side of the church, and they passed

18

him.

19

H e waited u n t i l h e saw h i s w i f e drive p a s t .

20

p o i n t he w o u l d h a v e c e r t a i n l y k n o w n that h i s m o t h e r - i n - l a w

21

in the car with her.

22

the parking lot of the church.

23

them.

24

without a word, in probably less than a minute, emptied the gun

25

into his wife.

They saw the car.

It's very clear to me he was there.
From the v a n t a g e

He watched them drive past.

It didn't take long.

was

He went into

He went around until he found

He stepped out of the car and

I am convinced he knew exactly what he was
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

2n?

50

doing.
Now, whether or not he was taking drugs, whether or
not he planned this for a day or for a half hour, he understood
exactly what he was doing.

He may not have understood all the

ramifications and how it would hurt all the people that have
spoken to me and the countless others who have not spoken to me
today, but he knew what he was doing.
As I indicated at the beginning, I spoke to the
attorneys.

I understood the reasons for the plea agreement and

I agreed to be bound by that.
today.

And I will follow that agreement

I think it was an appropriate resolution.

I think it

dealt with concerns from both parties; the families, the
victims the witnesses, the extended victims, so I have no
quarrel with how either side has resolved this matter today.
I think that the sentence I am about to impose is
appropriate.

I leave in the hands of the Board of Pardons,

because legally I can do no other thing, how long he stays
there.

That is their decision.

And much of what we have done

today is for the benefit of the Board of Pardons.
Mr. Ragsdale and Mr. Kawai, would you come up to the
podium.

On November 25th, Mr. Ragsdale, you entered a plea of

guilty to Count 1, aggravated murder, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated Section 76-5-202 in that you on or about January 6th,
2008, in Utah County, Utah, did intentionally or knowingly
cause the death of your wife, Kristy Ragsdale, and that you
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knowingly created a great risk of death to a person, in this
case three other people, other than the victim, your wife, and
yourself.
Pursuant to statute I know sentence you to an
indeterminate term of not less than 20 years in the Utah State
Prison which may also be for life.

I make a recommendation to

the Board of Pardons with regard to credit for time served as
follows:

As I calculated, and as the attorneys agreed with me,

it would be a total of 389 days.
recommendation.

As I indicated, that's a

In the end it's their determination as to

whether or not that credit is actually applied to your
sentence.
I agree with the recommendation of Adult Probation
and Parole that while you're incarcerated you should involve
yourself in any mental health therapy that's offered at the
Utah State Prison.

With regard to the issue of restitution, it

is my understanding that through the civil lawsuit that the
restitution with regard to the Estate of Kristy and for the
benefit of the children has been taken care of.

Is that

correct, Mr. Kawai?
MR. KAWAI:

That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT:

And Mr. Johnson?

MR. JOHNSON:

That's the State's understanding,

Judge.
THE COURT:

All right.

And I would indicate for the
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record that the case was also assigned to me and I have signed
off on the settlement documents in that case.

With regard to

the restitution for the Wigington family and therapy for their
children, I'm going to leave that issue open for a period of 60
days for the County Attorney's Office to research that issue.
And if they want, they can submit a motion and proposed order
to Mr. Kawai and the defense team and we'll take it from there.
If there's an objection, we'll have a hearing.

Otherwise, if

it's stipulated, I would go ahead and sign that order and
forward that to the Board of Pardons.

So I will reserve

jurisdiction to deal with that further issue of possible
restitution.
With that counsel, is there anything that I've
missed?
MR. JOHNSON:

I think you got it all, Judge.

MR. KAWAI:

No, your Honor.

THE COURT:

All right.

With that I remand the

defendant back to the custody of the Utah Sheriff's -- Utah
County Sheriff's Office for transportation to the Utah State
Prison.

Thank you very much, Counsel.

those who have spoken.

Thank you to all of

We'll be in recess.

(PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED
MATTER WERE CONCLUDED.)

CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

1
2 I

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

3 I STATE OF UTAH

)
:

SS

4 I County of Utah
5
6

I, Colleen C. Southwick, Registered Professional
Reporter for the State of Utah, do certify that the foregoing

7 I transcript was taken down by me stenographically from an
electronic recording and thereafter transcribed;
9 I
10

That the same constitutes a true and correct
transcription of the said proceedings;

11
12

That I am not of kin or otherwise associated with any
of the parties herein or their counsel, and that I am not

13 I interested in the events thereof.
14
15 I

WITNESS my hand at Provo, Utah, this 28th day of May,

16 I 2010.
17
18
19
20

ick, RPR, CSR

21
22
23
24
25
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

3rf\

